Abstract for “Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the House of Lords
and the Supreme Court
In 1992, the Law Lords (the judicial arm of the House of Lords) overruled more than two
centuries of precedent when it decided in Pepper v. Hart that courts could refer to and rely on
legislative history to aid in construing enacted laws. The ensuing fourteen years have witnessed a
robust debate among British judges and legal scholars as to the scope and propriety of Pepper.
This article offers the first empirical and comparative analysis of how Britain’s highest court has
used previously excluded legislative history materials in its judicial decisions.
Although the Law Lords opened the door to reliance on legislative history at a time when
the U.S. Supreme Court has been clamping down on such usage, the article demonstrates that
citation to parliamentary materials by the Law Lords since 1996 does not approach the levels of
reliance on congressional materials currently practiced by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding
Justice Scalia’s appreciable influence, Supreme Court justices continue to make use of legislative
history in their opinions between three and five times more often than their counterparts in
Britain. The article accounts for this divergent pattern of U.S. and British usage based on certain
key differences in their respective lawmaking processes and structures—notably the disparate
roles played by standing committees, the varying importance of legislative bargains following
bill introduction, and the breadth of legislative history sources available under each system.
Still, despite a spirited reaction to Pepper by several judges on the Law Lords, references
to legislative history have increased since 2000. Moreover, the Law Lords in two very recent
decisions have gone beyond Pepper in setting forth grounds for relying on parliamentary
materials. The article predicts that Britain’s highest court is in the process of consolidating if not
augmenting a permanent role for legislative history as an interpretive asset. The article then
suggests how this development should invite a different kind of dialogue about legislative history
among justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by
The House of Lords and the Supreme Court
James J. Brudney*
INTRODUCTION
[L]aws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy arising out of
specific situations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends. The difficulty is
that the legislative ideas which laws embody are both explicit and immanent. And so the
bottom problem is: what is below the surface of the words and yet fairly a part of them?1

Our legal community is not alone in debating the use of legislative history as a resource
for the interpretation of statutes. In 1992, the House of Lords in Pepper v. Hart2 overruled more
than two centuries of precedent when it decided that courts could refer to and rely on Hansard—
the official record of standing committee proceedings and parliamentary debates—to aid in
construing enacted laws. The ensuing period has witnessed intense disagreements over the scope
and propriety of Pepper. As is true in the U.S., the British debate has occurred among legal
scholars3 as well as judges, and the judicial exchanges have taken place both in academic
settings4 and through pronouncements from the bench.5
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The judicial arm of the House of Lords—known as the Law Lords6—has opened the door
to the use of legislative history at a time when the Supreme Court has been clamping down on
such usage.7 Accordingly, one might wonder if the British and American judicial systems are in
the process of trading places on this interpretive issue. In fact, however, citation to Hansard by
the Law Lords in the past decade does not approach the levels of reliance on legislative history
practiced by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the appreciable influence of Justice Scalia,
Supreme Court justices continue to make use of legislative history in their opinions between
three and five times more often than their counterparts in Britain.8
On the other hand, despite a spirited reaction to Pepper by several members of the Law
Lords,9 references to Hansard have been increasing in the years since 2000. Moreover, the great
majority of judges serving on Britain’s highest court over the past decade have invoked
legislative history materials in their opinions, many on a repeated basis.10 Thus, even if the Law
Lords are unlikely to value legislative history to the same extent as the Supreme Court, a new era
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Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 3 WLR 83, 93, 104, 106-07 (opinions of Lords Hoffman, Rodger, Carswell)
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of reliance on that history has been launched, and the debate among British judges is instructive
from a comparative standpoint.
This article offers the first empirical examination of how often, and in what ways,
Britain’s highest court has used previously excluded legislative history materials in its judicial
decisions. It also represents the first effort to compare legislative history treatment between the
Law Lords and the Supreme Court. The article’s comparative inquiry identifies differences in
the frequency with which legislative history is invoked in each court’s decisions, and offers
explanations for the distinct patterns of usage that have emerged.
Several key differences in national lawmaking structures and processes help account for
why legislative history usage remains substantially greater in the Supreme Court than in the Law
Lords.11 For a start, the committee report—a primary source of reliable legislative history in the
American context—is essentially absent from the British setting, where parliamentary standing
committees play only a peripheral role in creating and explaining bill language. Further,
negotiation and compromise following bill introduction are normal features of Congress’s
decentralized and discontinuous decisionmaking but are exceptional occurrences under the more
efficient methods by which bills are enacted in Parliament. Because legislative history in the
U.S. typically addresses the meaning of text that has been modified if not recast during the
lawmaking process, the Supreme Court often refers to that history to help understand legislative
bargains. Conversely, because legislative compromise is rarely required under Britain’s partycontrolled parliamentary regime, there is less need to refer to Hansard to explain text that
remains substantially unaltered since its introduction. Finally, parliamentary materials approved
for citation under the rule of Pepper consist almost exclusively of statements by government
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ministers.12 By contrast, our legislative history includes a richer and more diverse set of
materials generated at different stages by Congress and its committees, with executive branch
representatives cast in supporting roles at Congress’s invitation.13
Still, accepting that there are institutional reasons to anticipate less frequent use of
legislative history by the Law Lords than by the Supreme Court, the British innovation of
invoking Hansard as an interpretive aid is alive and well after fourteen years. The Law Lords
have recently indicated that parliamentary materials may be used under conditions broader than
those set forth in Pepper, and Hansard is admissible based on much the same intentionalist and
purposive justifications as have been applied by the Supreme Court to value legislative history
when construing statutory text. Although it remains early in the Law Lords’ venture with this
new interpretive asset, the article predicts that reliance on Hansard will continue and may even
increase in the future. The article then uses comparative analysis to offer preliminary thoughts as
to how each country’s highest court might learn from the other in their respective approaches to
legislative history usage.
The Law Lords since Pepper have framed their disagreements over legislative history in
less polarized terms than have been applied in the U.S. setting. British judges have tended to
argue over when and to what extent Hansard is probative in assisting courts to interpret
Parliament’s laws, whereas the current contest on the Supreme Court has been about whether
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legislative history should be admissible in court at all.14 Our judicial conversations could profit
from Britain’s more textured approach.
At the same time, legislative history applications adopted by the Law Lords have
involved a shifting series of aspirationally objective rules. The search for bright-line answers
may reflect an understandable judicial impulse to direct and confine the use of this new and
potentially open-ended interpretive resource. Yet the Supreme Court’s relatively ad hoc method
of applying legislative history, although messier in conceptual terms, arguably does a better job
of promoting flexibility in the interpretive enterprise. Such flexibility should be valued more by
Britain’s judiciary as it gains experience in reviewing and assessing parliamentary materials.
Part I of the Article presents recent developments in Britain, including the basic rule of
Pepper v. Hart and some key modifications or refinements of the rule announced in subsequent
decisions. Part II begins with a quantitative comparison between the Law Lords’ invocation of
Hansard since 1996 and the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history during the same time
period. Part II then considers whether there are sound reasons for courts to rely less often on
legislative history in Britain than in the United States. The comparison focuses on the nature of
the legislative process in the two countries and on separation of powers issues, including the
risks of opportunistic behavior by creators of legislative history. Part III examines certain
elements of the current debate among British judges, using these elements to predict future uses
of Hansard by the Law Lords. Part III also identifies differences between the British and
American approaches that may be instructive for the Supreme Court in one respect and for the
Law Lords in another.
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I. CHANGES WROUGHT BY PEPPER V. HART
In the United States, federal courts began relying on legislative history to construe
statutes in the latter part of the nineteenth century.15 The Supreme Court’s robust appetite for
this interpretive resource dates primarily from the period after 1940, but judicial reliance
increased gradually during much of the twentieth century.16 The absence of a single moment of
self-conscious change by our courts contrasts notably with British experience. Pepper v. Hart
was a watershed decision in constitutional as well as practical terms, and the Law Lords have
revisited the ruling and its effects in remarkably frank terms. After fourteen years of soul
searching and some second thoughts, Britain’s highest court seems unlikely to backtrack on its
commitment to the utility of legislative history as an interpretive resource.
A. The Law Before Pepper
As far back as 1769, British courts refused to consider parliamentary proceedings as an
aid to statutory construction.17 By the mid nineteenth century, courts had extended the
exclusionary rule to bar examination of pre-legislative preparatory materials, such as reports
authored by government-appointed commissioners that often formed the basis for the statute
under review.18 The courts relaxed this harsher approach around 1900, allowing judges to refer
in their opinions to commission reports and White Papers19 for the purpose of determining the
15

For a major decision inaugurating modern practice, see Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 464-65 (1892). For isolated earlier examples, see Blake v. National Bank, 90 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1875);
Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1879).
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William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 392 (1990).
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Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 2 Burr. 2303, 2332 (Willes J.) (KB). See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 60-61 (Lord
Browne-Wilkinson).
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Salkeld v. Johnson (1848) 154 E.R. 487, 495; 2 Exch. 256, 273. See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 61 (LordBrowne-Wilkinson).
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White Papers (printed on white paper) announce reasonably firm government policy on a particular issue and
precede the introduction of a bill. In the words of former Prime Minister Harold Wilson, “A White Paper is
essentially a statement of government policy in such terms that withdrawal or major amendment, following
consultation or public debate, tends to be regarded as a humiliating withdrawal.” HAROLD WILSON, THE LABOUR
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“mischief” a statute was intended to address, although not for the purpose of construing the
words chosen by Parliament to address that mischief.20 Still, as late as 1980, it was technically
prohibited for parties to cite in court anything said in the House of Commons without first
obtaining consent from the House.21
The justifications offered for excluding all references to parliamentary proceedings have
been both constitutional and pragmatic. From a constitutional standpoint, Article 9 of the
English Bill of Rights safeguards the freedom of parliamentary debates and proceedings against
impeachment or questioning in the courts or other locations besides Parliament.22 Some judges
and scholars concluded that this provision protects not simply the freedom of parliamentary
debate but the debates and proceedings as a whole, maintaining that to review or analyze in court
what is said by a bill sponsor or government minister in committee or on the floor of Parliament
is to violate Article 9.23 A second constitutional justification, based on separation of powers, was
that allowing floor statements by individual legislators to shed light on the intent or effect of a
law would confuse the distinct roles of Parliament as sovereign in the making of laws and courts
as sovereign in their interpretation.24
The earliest judicial explanation for refusing to admit parliamentary materials, however,
was practical rather than constitutional—House of Commons debates were not fully or
GOVERNMENT 1964-70, 380 (1971). By contrast, Green Papers announce more tentative government proposals,
ready for public discussion but with the government remaining uncommitted. Id. See generally Gary Slapper &
David Kelly, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 57 (6th ed. 2003).
20
Eastman Photographic Materials Co. Ltd. v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks [1898]
A.C. 571, 575 (Earl of Halsbury, LC). See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 61 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
21
David Miers, Citing Hansard as an Aid to Interpretation, 4 STAT. L. REV. 98, 99 (1983). See Zander, supra note
6, at 161.
22
Article 9 states Parliament’s resolution “That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament,
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.” 1 W.&M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
23
See Francis Bennion, Hansard—Help or Hindrance? A Draftman’s View of Pepper v. Hart, 14 STAT. L. REV. 149,
152 n. 14 (1993) (citing William Blackstone, 1 COMMENTARIES 163 (17th ed. 1830)). Hansard’s Official Report
includes the edited verbatim proceedings from both Houses and their standing committees. See
www.parliament.uk/Hansard.
24
See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 63-64 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (reciting argument for exclusion
propounded by the Government).
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accurately reported.25 Even after 1909, when Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates offered an
authoritative and comprehensive report of proceedings,26 the time and expense involved in
reading all potentially relevant debates, and the special burden this would impose on parties with
lesser resources, continued to be regarded as serious obstacles.27 In 1969, when the Law
Commissions of England and Scotland presented their comprehensive report on statutory
interpretation, the commissioners recognized that Hansard was sufficiently relevant to the
interpretative task of courts to warrant consideration.28 Nonetheless, the commissioners
recommended that the exclusionary rule be retained largely for practical reasons. They pointed
to the difficulty of isolating the truly valuable information found in parliamentary debates and
the consequent challenge of providing such information in a convenient and accessible form.29
Like many major breaks with legal precedent or tradition, the decision in Pepper v. Hart
did not simply materialize out of thin air. After the Law Commissions’ extended and thoughtful
treatment, some appellate judges in the 1970s began voicing doubts as to the ongoing basis for a
rigid rule of non-admissibility. A judge in one case advocated reliance on Hansard for the
purpose of identifying the mischief at which a law was aimed.30 Lord Denning in the Court of
Appeal went further, citing Hansard to help interpret and apply the statutory words under
review.31 In the course of his opinion, Lord Denning lamented that too often judges “grope
about in the dark for the meaning of an Act” because they are denied access to what is said in

25

See Millar v. Taylor, supra note 17, at 2332 (giving as reason for refusing to consider parliamentary proceedings
“That history [of changes a bill underwent in the House where it was first debated and approved] is not known to the
other house, or to the sovereign”).
26
See The Official Report pp. 2-3, Fact Sheet G17, House of Commons Information Office (revised 2003), available
at www.parliament.uk/factsheets; Vogenauer supra note 3, at 631.
27
See Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C. 58, 74 (Lord Reid); Bennion, supra note 23, at 143.
28
The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, The Interpretation of Statutes, Law Commission No. 21
and Scottish Law Commission No. 11, 31-32 (1969).
29
Id. at 36.
30
Race Relations Board v. Dockers’ Labour Club & Institute [1976] A.C. 285, 299 (Lord Simon).
31
Davis v. Johnson, [1979] A.C. 264, 276-77 (CA) (Lord Denning).
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Parliament.32 He added that “[a]lthough it may shock the purists” there was nothing to stop
judges from consulting the debates on their own and gleaning guidance from them, something he
himself “confessed” to having done on numerous occasions.33 Upon further appeal, the House of
Lords disagreed with Lord Denning’s position and re-affirmed the exclusionary rule,34 but the
debate was becoming more open.
In the years immediately preceding Pepper, the Law Lords recognized certain limited
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One involved consideration of a government minister’s
policy statement to Parliament explaining how the Government proposed to implement its broad
statutory authority in a specific setting.35 The parliamentary statement was deemed relevant in
determining whether the minister had unlawfully exceeded his powers under the Act.36 Another
exception involved interpretation of delegated or secondary legislation—known as statutory
instruments—designed to carry out requirements under European Community law.37 The Law
Lords relied on the Hansard account of government explanations and member criticisms as an
aid to determining Parliament’s intent in approving the regulations,38 although in doing so they
observed that such delegated legislation was not subject to the same parliamentary processes of
consideration and amendment that a Bill would face.39
These fairly modest inroads were followed, in November 1992, by the sea change of
Pepper v. Hart, holding that reference to Hansard would henceforth be permitted as an aid to the

32

Id.
Id.
34
Id. at 337 (Viscount Dilhorne), 349-50 (Lord Scarman). See also S.G.G. Edgar, CRAIES ON STATUTE LAW 128-29
(Sweet & Maxwell 7th ed. 1971) (summarizing traditional position excluding debates in Parliament).
35
See Brind v. Sec’y of State the Home Dept. [1991] 1 All Eng. Rep. 720. The decision addressed the
Government’s policy directing broadcast media to ban television or radio appearances by persons representing
certain proscribed terrorist organizations.
36
See id. at 723-24 (Lord Bridge), 729-30 (Lord Ackner).
37
See Pickstone v. Freemans plc [1988] 2 All Eng. Rep. 803.
38
See id. at 806-07 (Lord Keith), 814-15 (Lord Templeman).
39
See id. at 807 (Lord Keith), 814 (Lord Tempelman).
33
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interpretation of primary legislation. In reaching its decision by a six-to-one majority, the Law
Lords disavowed contrary holdings and rationales from a number of earlier decisions.40
B. The Rule of Pepper
Pepper v. Hart involved a tax statute; the controversy arose over how to measure the
taxable fringe benefit received by nine members of the teaching staff at an independent boys’
school.41 Pursuant to a concessionary fee scheme operated by the school, the teachers’ sons were
educated at a charge of one-fifth the fees paid by members of the public. The school was not
filled to capacity, and its marginal costs in educating these additional boys were very low—
minimal amounts for food, laundry, school supplies, etc.42 The boys’ parents argued that they
owed no taxes at all, because the value of the fringe benefit they received was less than the onefifth fees they had paid. The Crown, on behalf of the Inspector of Taxes, maintained that the
expense incurred by the school was simply the average cost of its providing for the education of
all enrolled children; this average cost well exceeded the one-fifth fees paid by the nine teaching
staff, and thus taxes were owed on the difference.43
The Finance Act of 1976 provided that the proper measure of a taxable benefit was the
“cash equivalent of the benefit.”44 Another section of the Act defined that phrase as “an amount
equal to the cost of the benefit,” but its further textual elaborations might plausibly be viewed as
meaning either an employer’s marginal cost or its average cost.45 At the conclusion of oral

40

See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 60-69 (abandoning rule set forth in Beswick v. Beswick [1968], BlackClawson International [1975], Davis v. Johnson [1979] and Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd [1980]).
41
See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 42.
42
See id. at 54.
43
See id. at 54.
44
Finance Act, 1976, c. 2, §61.
45
Section 63(1) defines “cash equivalent of the benefit chargeable to tax under section 61” as “an amount equal to
the cost of the benefit” (emphasis added), arguably suggesting the marginal cost to the employer of providing the
benefit. Section 63(2) adds that “the cost of a benefit…includes a proper proportion of any expense relating partly
to the benefit and partly to other matters” (emphasis added), suggesting perhaps more strongly the average cost to
the employer of educating each child under its supervision.
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argument, the Law Lords by a four-to-one margin determined that the text should be construed in
favor of the Government.46 They reasoned that “cost of the benefit”—in traditional accountancy
terms and as a matter of ordinary meaning—was properly understood in this setting to signify the
average cost of providing the same educational benefit to all boys in the school.47
Before the decision issued, however, it was brought to the Law Lords’ attention that in
the course of debate on the passage of the 1976 Act, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury had
responded to questions in the House of Commons on virtually the precise circumstances
presented in the pending appeal.48 The Law Lords then held a second hearing before an enlarged
panel of seven judges, addressed to the question of whether it was appropriate for the court to
depart from its exclusionary rule and if so whether Hansard provided any guidance in deciding
the instant case.49 The court answered yes on both counts.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson authored the leading speech. His primary reason for modifying
the rule on Hansard was that to do so would further the court’s “duty…to give effect to the
intention of Parliament.”50 Recognizing that ambiguities in enacted text were inevitable, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson noted that in many if not most cases the parliamentary materials would shed
no light on the interpretive matter facing the court. But in those few instances where statements
made during debates provide “a clear indication of what Parliament intended in using those

46

See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 42 (listing five Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who heard the initial 1991
appeal); id. at 52 (remarks of Lord Griffiths, describing himself as “in a judicial minority of one at the end of the
first hearing”); id. at 52 (remarks of Lord Oliver, describing majority’s determination to dismiss taxpayers’ appeal at
end of first hearing).
47
See id. at 52 (remarks of Lord Oliver, justifying his initial position); id. at 72 (remarks of Lord BrowneWilkinson, justifying his initial position).
48
See id. at 54-55 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
49
See id. at 55 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). See also note 6 supra (discussing use of larger panels for especially
important issues).
50
See Pepper [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 64.
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words,” it would be wrong for courts to “blind themselves” to such evidence and risk adopting a
construction that would thwart rather than enforce Parliament’s true design.51
In addition to this argument based in effect on strengthening parliamentary supremacy,
Lord Browne-Wilkinson relied on more pragmatic considerations as well. One was the illogical
nature of current legal distinctions regarding admissibility. Courts had long been permitted to
examine White Papers and commission reports to help ascertain the mischief which a law aimed
to correct; a ministerial statement made in Parliament was no less authoritative in this regard.52
Likewise, the Law Lords had invited courts to rely on ministerial statements made when
introducing statutory instruments that could not be amended by Parliament; such statements were
not sensibly distinguishable from ministers’ introductory statements explaining primary
legislation, much of which is never amended prior to passage.53 A further pragmatic concern
was that the rule against admissibility was impeding fairness and transparency in the litigation
process. It prevented parties from addressing the courts on parliamentary materials even though
many distinguished judges had admitted they were peeking at Hansard and drawing their own
inferences as to parliamentary intent.54
Lord Browne-Wilkinson went on to consider and discuss the various practical and
constitutional objections relied on by courts in the past to justify the exclusionary rule. He
concluded that concerns over library access and lack of satisfactory indexing for Hansard were
overstated; similar concerns had been voiced with respect to the growing number of statutory
instruments, but practitioners were coping with those materials even if at some expense.55

51

See id. Relatedly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson also noted the importance of “the purposive approach to construction
now [widely] adopted by the courts in order to give effect to the true intentions of the legislature.” Id. at 65.
52
See id. at 65.
53
Id. (drawing analogy to Pickstone v. Freemans, discussed supra at notes 37-39 and accompanying text).
54
Id. at 66.
55
Id.
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Concerns that lawyers and judges lacked the sophistication to sift and assess the weight of
various parliamentary statements also were deemed exaggerated.56 Although there would be
research costs from combing through Hansard in hopes of finding clear evidence as to what
Parliament intended, these costs were easily over-estimated, especially given the limited nature
of what would be admissible under the court’s new standard.57
The majority also made relatively short work of the two leading constitutional defenses
for excluding Hansard. With respect to the Article 9 argument, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
reasoned that it stretched language and common sense too far to conclude that the use of Hansard
for the purpose of construing a statute in a court was a “questioning [of] proceedings in
parliament.” Moreover, such a conclusion would then have to apply to all media reports
reviewing or commenting on what is said in Parliament, an untenable result.58 With regard to the
separation of powers argument, the majority observed that although statutory words are indeed
the law, courts rely on a range of extrinsic sources as aids to construction of those words,
including White Papers and official government reports. Reliance on parliamentary materials in
some circumstances as a further means of assisting the court to make its own interpretive
determination raised no new constitutional question.59 It is noteworthy that the one Lord who
disagreed with the majority’s decision to eliminate the exclusionary rule had no constitutional
concerns over this outcome; his reservations were directed only at the cost-related practical
arguments.60

56

Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67. For discussion of court’s standard, see infra at notes 61-63 and accompanying text. Lord Griffiths,
concurring in the result, emphasized that modern technology “greatly facilitates” the retrieval of Hansard materials,
adding that based on personal experience “it does not take long to recall and assemble the relevant passages in which
the particular section was dealt with in Parliament, nor does it take long to see if anything relevant was said.” Id. at
50.
58
Id. at 67-68.
59
Id. at 69.
60
Id. at 48 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern).
57
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Having determined to depart from longstanding precedent, the majority made clear that
its modification was limited and subject to certain safeguards. Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated
that courts should refer to parliamentary materials to aid in statutory construction only if three
conditions were met. First, the text in question must be ambiguous or obscure, or its literal
meaning must lead to an absurdity.61 Even then, judicial reliance would be proper only if the
parliamentary material was clear either as to the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention
lying behind the unclear words.62 Finally, in order for such parliamentary statements to be clear,
they would have to be made by a government minister or other primary proponent of the bill,
perhaps accompanied by questions or replies from members that provided proper context.63
The majority was confident that its three part test would constrain counsel’s inclination to
invoke Hansard, and thereby limit the costs to parties and courts of having to review and analyze
parliamentary materials.64 To reinforce these limits, Lord-Browne Wilkinson added that
attempts to introduce parliamentary material which failed to satisfy the three factors should
trigger an order for costs against the offending party.65 In addition, a Practice Direction was
issued in 1994, specifying that five working days before a hearing, any party intending to refer to
Hansard in court must provide the court and all other parties with copies of the Hansard extract
and a summary of the planned argument based on that extract.66 This direction to counsel, which
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authorized sanctions for noncompliance, reinforced the judicial view that references to Hansard
were not to be undertaken lightly.
The Pepper majority applied its new test to the 1976 Finance Act and determined that the
parliamentary material was admissible and highly probative. Reasoning that the “cost of the
benefit” language in the law was ambiguous as between an employer’s marginal or average
cost,67 Lord Browne-Wilkinson proceeded to consider the Financial Secretary’s statements in
Parliament. The statutory section at issue had sparked concern among members because of its
possible impact on concessionary travel benefits regularly bestowed on airline and railway
employees. Existing government practice had been not to tax such benefits on an average cost
basis. The Secretary announced at the start of a standing committee meeting in May 1976
(reported in Hansard) his withdrawal of a proposed subsection that would have taxed in-house
benefits at the price paid by the public.68 The Secretary offered several policy reasons for this
change; he also responded to various member inquiries by explaining that the marginal cost
approach would continue to apply for such benefits, and he repeated his determination to leave
the status quo unaltered in a government press release issued that day.69
The following month at a further committee meeting on the bill, a member asked the
Secretary whether the government’s earlier language modification would apply to concessionary
fee arrangements for children of staff at private schools. The Secretary responded affirmatively,
stating the government’s change meant that “now the [educational] benefit will be assessed on
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Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 69-70.
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the cost to the employer, which would be very small indeed.”70 There was no further relevant
debate on the language prior to enactment.
For Lord Browne-Wilkinson, this legislative history was both clear and persuasive.
Committee members had repeatedly pressed the government for guidance on the in-house
benefits matter following the change in text, the minister’s statements were directly responsive
and unambiguous, and the matter was not raised again after the extended committee discussion.
Under these circumstances, the majority reasoned that it was proper “to attribute to Parliament as
a whole the same intention as that repeatedly voiced by the Financial Secretary.”71
The factual setting in Pepper, where the government argued in court for an interpretation
it had expressly disavowed when promoting the bill in Parliament, might have led the Law Lords
to adopt a narrower estoppel-type justification for the relevance of materials found in Hansard.
Under this approach, courts would have been given access to Hansard only in cases where the
government’s denial in court of a prior officially endorsed position amounted to fundamental
unfairness. Counsel for the taxpayers at one point came close to embracing such a rationale,72
and some Law Lords have subsequently tried to limit Pepper’s scope based on this theory.73
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion, however, does not rely on the injustice of the government’s
reversing its position. His rationale for imputing collective intent is broader than that:
irrespective of the equities involved, “what is persuasive in this case is a consistent series of
answers given by the minister, after opportunities for taking advice from his officials, all of
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which point the same way and which were not withdrawn or varied prior to the enactment of the
bill.”74
C. Developments Since Pepper
In the years following Pepper, the Law Lords have expressed a range of reactions in
considering how and how often to make use of parliamentary materials. The responses by the
court as a whole may be divided into three periods. An initial interval of fairly frequent
references to Hansard was followed by a more muted span in which doubts surfaced as to the
benefits of the Pepper approach. The third and current period involves more open disagreement
among the Law Lords themselves. Although several Law Lords have expressed regrets about the
door that Pepper opened, most appear to remain convinced of its wisdom and the court’s
references to Hansard have increased in the years since 2000.
1. Initial Enthusiasm
Within the first fifteen months after Pepper came down, nine House of Lords decisions
invoked parliamentary materials to help explain the meaning of text.75 Given that the Law Lords
decided between forty and fifty cases per year in this period,76 and that some cases did not
involve matters of statutory construction, the nine instances qualified as a surge of interest in
legislative history. Certain decisions reflected tangential use of Hansard,77 but often the judges
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found the previously forbidden fruit to be influential in resolving an interpretive controversy.78
For instance, Lord Griffiths in one decision invoked Hansard to establish that an earlier court had
misapprehended Parliament’s true intent with respect to a statute of limitations provision.79 And
Lord Bridge, faced with a language gap regarding appellate courts’ authority to order payment of
attorneys’ costs, remarked that “Happily our new freedom to refer to Hansard solves the
mystery.”80
During this initial period, the Law Lords were less than rigorous in applying Pepper’s
three-part test. On a number of occasions, the judges invoked parliamentary material as
admissible and relevant without discussing at all the basis for concluding that the Pepper factors
had been met.81 Further, the court’s analysis often indicated that Hansard was being referenced
or relied on even though the Pepper factors had not been fulfilled. Thus, the judges invoked
Hansard as support for what they independently understood to be the meaning of the text.82 Such
confirmatory references may be perfectly reasonable, but Pepper had declared there could be no
usage at all unless the text was found to be truly ambiguous or obscure.
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2. The Bloom Fades
From early 1994 through 1999, the court’s usage of Hansard in statutory interpretation
cases notably diminished. Over a period of close to six years in which the Law Lords decided
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roughly fifty cases per year, the judges invoked parliamentary materials in their opinions in a
mere thirteen decisions, barely more than twice each calendar year. Apart from the decline in
citations to Hansard, there are further indications that the Law Lords had become somewhat less
enamored of the new interpretive resource.
On a number of occasions, attorneys’ legal contentions relying on parliamentary
materials were simply ignored in the opinions of the court.84 Counsel may well have been
encouraged to include Hansard materials in their argument by the Law Lords’ initial burst of
enthusiasm, and the court’s silence would not alone be sufficient to establish judicial misgivings.
In some instances, however, the Law Lords went further than silence, voicing concern at what
they regarded as excessive efforts to promote Hansard. Thus, Lord Hobhouse in his concurring
opinions referred briefly to counsel’s unsuccessful attempt at reliance on Hansard, “purportedly
under Pepper”85 and also criticized a lower court judge by name for taking account of
parliamentary debates when Pepper gave “no warrant for such an approach.”86
More frequently in this period, the Law Lords considered but dismissed arguments
relying on Hansard because one or more of Pepper’s three factors had not been met. In
particular, the court several times determined that the legislative history being cited was itself
unclear or not sufficiently definitive.87 In 1995, Lord Browne-Wilkinson—the author of
Pepper—complained about counsel overreaching in their introduction of Hansard. He criticized
the government in a tax case for relying on parliamentary materials directed to a separate tax
provision than the one under judicial review, adding that to seek guidance from a wholly distinct
84
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Minor), [1997] A.C. 489, 492 (same); O’Rourke v. Camden London Borough Council, [1998] A.C. 188, 190 (same);
Reg. v. Home Secretary Ex p. Stafford, [1999] 2 A.C. 38, 41 (same).
85
R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions Ex p. Kebiline, [1999] 4 All Eng. Rep. 801, 851.
86
Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Assoc. Ltd. [1994] 4 All Eng. Rep. 705, 745.
87
See Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) v. BMI Ltd., [1995] 4 All Eng. Rep. 453, 468 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Sec’y
of State v. Remilien, [1998] 1 All Eng. Rep. 129, 146-47 (Lord Hoffman); Reg. v. Bow Street Magistrate Ex p.
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legislative proceeding was “an improper use of the relaxed rule introduced by Pepper.”88 Noting
that such efforts to widen the permissible category of parliamentary materials offered no
assistance but risked considerable expense and delay, Lord Browne-Wilkinson invited an
appropriate order as to costs wasted in such settings.89
Notwithstanding their concerns that counsel were at times pushing the “relaxed rule” of
Pepper too far, the Law Lords continued to rely on Hansard materials to help them resolve
disputes over statutory meaning.90 Moreover, the court on occasion sent mixed signals even
when formally disavowing reliance on Hansard. In a 1997 decision, the leading speech observed
that certain parliamentary materials were not admissible because the text itself was
unambiguous, but then proceeded to refer to them for informational background purposes.91
Within the academic community, the Law Lords’ decision to admit parliamentary
materials, which had been greeted with skepticism from the start,92 continued to generate
negative reactions. Academic critics in the late 1990s reiterated that separation of powers
principles should preclude judicial reliance on statements by members of the executive or
legislative branches interpreting the law they were enacting.93 These critics also challenged the
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notion that statements by government ministers could reflect the intention of Parliament,
insisting that collective intent was derivable only from the words of the text.94
By the late 1990s, some Law Lords were publicly questioning the benefits of the new
interpretive approach. In a 1997 lecture, Lord Hoffman expressed sympathy in principle for
judicial use of Hansard both because it could estop the executive from abandoning interpretive
representations made before Parliament and because a high profile ministerial statement from
which no member dissented was at times the best evidence of what Parliament must have
understood it was approving.95 Yet Lord Hoffman was doubtful whether the time and money
spent on Hansard research was justified given how seldom it yielded truly probative results.96 In
a 1999 address, Lord Millett was more blunt, referring to Pepper as a “regrettable decision” in
practical terms and also as a matter of constitutional principle. He discussed the impropriety of
relying on unenacted intentions as well as the largely unproductive costs of Hansard-related
research.97 Lord Millett added, however, that while he objected to judicial references to the
course of proceedings in Parliament, he endorsed “the practice of the American Congress of
publishing detailed explanatory memoranda” that were not “made in the heat of debate”98; this
presumably refers to our committee reports.
Beginning in 2000, the concerns that had been voiced extrajudicially became part of an at
times heated dialogue aired through the judicial opinions of the Law Lords.
3. Full-scale Debate
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An opening salvo from Lord Steyn, a member of the Law Lords since 1994, focused the
terms of the debate. In his Hart Lecture delivered at Oxford in May 2000, Lord Steyn assumed a
lead critic’s role comparable to Justice Scalia. He acknowledged that he initially had supported
the court’s majority opinion but declared that he had come to regard its current application as
indefensible primarily on separation of powers grounds.99
Lord Steyn did not propose to overrule Pepper, but instead to limit its scope. He believed
Hansard could be cited by a court to identify the mischief at which a law was aimed, for the
reasons given by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper.100 He also believed Hansard should be
relied on by courts to prevent the executive from repudiating prior representations made to
Parliament as to the meaning of statutory text—developing the estoppel argument suggested
earlier by Lord Hoffman.101 What he renounced, however, was the broader rationale for citing to
Hansard: it was “constitutionally unacceptable…to treat the intentions of the government as
revealed in debates as reflecting the will of Parliament.”102 Lord Steyn has presented his
proposed limitations on Pepper in a number of judicial opinions. He has invoked parliamentary
materials to help determine the mischief that the statute is intended to correct,103 while
maintaining that ministerial statements in Hansard should be used only to identify such mischief
or as an estoppel against the executive, not as evidence reflecting what Parliament meant by
particular statutory words or phrases.104
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In the years since 2000, a number of Law Lords have expressed disappointment over
what they view as the scant benefits and considerable costs associated with the use of Hansard.
The court has been regularly attentive to Pepper’s three factors, often finding Hansard materials
inappropriate because ministerial statements were inconclusive105 and sometimes rejecting
Hansard because the text itself was clear.106 Lord Hoffman in 2002 was more outspoken,
declaring that based on ten years of experience under Pepper, the dissenting judge in that
decision “has turned out to be the better prophet” with respect to how rarely Hansard is helpful
as against how heavily counsel invest in mining the “large spoil heap of [parliamentary]
material.”107
Apart from giving vent to practical frustrations, the Law Lords have identified some
additional limits on the scope of Pepper. In Reg. v. Secretary of State for the Environment Ex p.
Spath Holme,108 decided in December 2000, the issue was whether a statutory power to restrict
rent increases could be exercised by the Secretary solely in order to control inflation; if so, then
controlling rents for a different reason (to mitigate hardship for a class of tenants) was ultra
vires.109 The Court of Appeal had consulted Hansard to help determine that the rent-restricting
powers had been enacted as part of government counterinflationary policy and therefore the

opinion). While Lord Steyn tendered his estoppel argument as a preferred modification of Pepper, Lord Hope has
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Secretary’s use of them for another reason was unlawful.110 The Law Lords reversed, construing
the relevant text to hold that there were no inflation-related limitations on the Secretary’s
authority to impose a rent ceiling.111
More important for Hansard purposes, the lead opinion went on to distinguish Pepper,
which had turned on the meaning of a particular statutory phrase, from the instant case which
involved the scope of the government’s discretionary powers conferred by statute. Lord
Bingham, who delivered the leading speech, reasoned that because such powers are inevitably
open-ended, a minister’s contribution in Parliament is very unlikely to resolve doubts about all or
even most future uses of these powers.112 He concluded—echoing to some extent Lord Steyn’s
estoppel rationale—that unless a ministerial statement or response gave “a categorical assurance
to Parliament that a power would not be used in a given situation, such that Parliament could be
taken to have legislated on that basis,” ministerial statements addressed to the scope of a
discretionary power were inadmissible.113
The Law Lords announced a further restraint on judicial use of Hansard in Wilson v. First
County Trust Ltd.,114 issued in July 2003. That case involved whether a 1974 consumer credit
statute was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights, which had been
integrated into British law pursuant to the 1998 Human Rights Act.115 As part of its review, the
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court considered whether Hansard materials could be consulted in order to help determine
compatibility.
Lord Nicholls, authoring the leading speech, concluded that courts were allowed to
invoke parliamentary materials in this setting but only to a limited extent. He noted that
evaluating the effect of domestic legislation to ascertain whether British law was incompatible
with European Convention rights is a different enterprise from directly interpreting and applying
such legislation.116 If the domestic law infringes on a convention right, a court must determine
whether the law’s policy objective presumptively justifies such an infringement given the nature
of the convention right, and also whether the means employed by the domestic law to achieve its
policy objective are proportionate in terms of the adverse effect.117 Lord Nicholls concluded that
when identifying a law’s policy objective or assessing its proportionality, a court is permitted to
consult Hansard to seek “enlightenment on the nature and extent of the social problem (the
‘mischief’) at which the legislation is aimed,” but not to explore statutory meaning in further
respects.118
Lord Nicholls likened this approved use of Hansard “as a source of background
information” to other “innocuous” uses previously countenanced under Pepper; he referred
specifically to the use of ministerial statements that help identify the background when
construing domestic statutes or that assist a court in understanding government policy when
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reviewing contested agency decisions.119 But Lord Nicholls added that beyond such reliance for
background information purposes, Hansard was not relevant to the issues a court must resolve in
compatibility cases. In particular, a statute’s proportionality was to be addressed based on its
text, not the quality of reasons advanced by its proponents or the state of mind of ministers
debating its merits.120
The decisions since 2000 thus disclose a range of practical and conceptual misgivings
associated with reliance on Hansard. Judges have complained about the disproportionate
burdens on clients, counsel, and courts from having to sift through parliamentary materials.
Individual opinions also have articulated several possible grounds for limiting Hansard’s
admissibility when construing the meaning of statutory text. These include refusing to consider
ministerial statements that address the scope of a discretionary government power, or that bear
on incompatibility under the Human Rights Acts, or that extend beyond estopping the
government from contradicting in court what it previously said in Parliament.
Notwithstanding such doubts, however, the Law Lords have by no means abandoned the
basic rule of Pepper. In the years from 2002 through 2005, Hansard materials were discussed by
one or more panel members in forty out of some 250 decided cases—an average of ten per
119
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calendar year and roughly one-sixth of the court’s decisions. There are a number of occasions
where Hansard was invoked for one of the purposes labeled “innocuous” in Wilson: to
understand agency implementations of government policy that are subject to judicial review121 or
to identify the background mischief at which a statute is aimed.122 Still the largest single number
of decisions involve reference to Hansard to shed light on the meaning of possibly inconclusive
statutory words or phrases.123
A recent broad-based discussion of Pepper and its applications took place in Reg.
(Jackson) v. Attorney General,124 decided in October 2005, in which nine Lords of Appeal in
Ordinary participated. This case indicates that some Law Lords remain willing to apply Pepper
in its more controversial sense, although certainly not Lord Steyn. Jackson involved a challenge
to the validity of the Hunting Act of 2004. The statute, which prohibited fox-hunting, had been
enacted without approval from the House of Lords, consistent with a special procedure for
bypassing the upper chamber that had been enacted in 1911 and modified in 1949.125 The real
question presented was whether this special procedure, enacted as section 2(1) of the 1911 law,
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authorized its own further modification by the Commons alone, as had occurred in 1949.126 The
Court of Appeal had concluded that the 1911 Act was inconclusive on its face, and had relied
extensively on parliamentary materials from 1911 to determine that the special procedure could
lawfully be used to amend itself, and therefore the 1949 Act modifications (as applied in 2004)
were valid.127
The Law Lords unanimously upheld the validity of the Hunting Act, dismissing the legal
challenge to the 1949 law’s enactment. With respect to reliance on Hansard, Lord Bingham’s
leading speech concluded that reference to the parliamentary debates and explanatory statements
from ministers was unnecessary because the 1911 text, properly understood, was neither
ambiguous nor obscure.128 Lord Bingham did invoke Hansard, however, to establish how the
record of amendments to section 2(1) considered by the Commons majority helped illuminate the
meaning of key words in that section. Specifically, section 2(1) as initially drafted had applied
its special procedure to “any Public Bill other than a Money Bill.”129 Over a period of four
months, the Commons considered at least nine amendments proposing to enlarge the class of
bills to which the new special procedure would not apply.130 Observing that one of these
amendments was accepted but eight were “uniformly rejected” by the Commons, Lord Bingham
concluded: “it is clear from the historical background that Parliament did intend the word “any,”
subject to the noted exceptions [in text], to mean exactly what it said.”131
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See id. at 1256-67. The 1911 Act, approved by both houses, permitted the House of Commons to bypass the
House of Lords and enact into law a bill approved by the Commons in three successive sessions, provided the period
of time between second reading in the first session and passage in the third session was at least two years. Id. at
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Thus, although Lord Bingham’s lead speech made a point of eschewing reliance on
ministerial statements offered in the course of parliamentary debate, it relied directly on the
statute’s drafting history—recorded in Hansard but hardly obvious from the face of the text as
finally enacted—to help explain the meaning of statutory words. Lord Nicholls in a concurring
speech was prepared to go further with Hansard. He concluded that section 2(1) was sufficiently
clear, but he also believed the ministerial statements made during parliamentary passage of the
1911 Act were valuable to confirm the apparent meaning of the text.132 Citing to statements by
the Prime Minister among others, Lord Nicholls urged open recognition of their relevance in the
interests of transparency.133
On the other side, Lord Steyn (also concurring in the result) restated his preference for
limiting Pepper to situations of estoppel against the government whenever Hansard is being
invoked to discover the intended meaning of enacted text.134 He was content here, however, to
rely on Pepper’s three-part test and exclude Hansard references because the text itself was
clear.135 Lord Walker, Lord Carswell, and Lord Brown opined more briefly that resort to
Hansard was unnecessary in this case.136
The latest indication of Pepper’s continuing vitality occurred in July 2006, when three
members of the Law Lords made a point of observing that reliance on Hansard remains valuable
as an aid to the construction of text, including text that is not ambiguous or obscure. In Harding
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v. Wealands,137 Lord Hoffmann—who had voiced misgivings about Pepper in some prior
opinions—delivered a leading speech in which he relied at length on parliamentary proceedings
to help explain what was meant in a private international law statute by “procedure,” even
though he regarded the term as clear without resorting to Hansard.138 Lord Rodger applied a
similar analysis, noting that available Hansard materials not only confirmed but strengthened the
textual construction he would have offered anyway.139 Lord Carswell added a hopeful gloss on
the court’s extended travails regarding legislative history. He characterized Pepper as having
been “out of judicial favour” in recent years, but expressed regret over this development, adding
that ministerial statements were at times useful as an interpretive resource, “perhaps especially
as a confirmatory aid.”140
To sum up, the Law Lords in 2006 continue to rely on Hansard materials as an aid to
statutory interpretation, albeit less enthusiastically than they did in the first fifteen months after
Pepper was decided. There is reason to believe that lower courts are referring to Hansard with
some regularity as well, although such usage is beyond the scope of this article.141 Lord Steyn’s
proposal to restrict judicial uses of Hansard to estoppel situations remains on the table, but it
seems doubtful that most current Lords of Appeal would endorse it.142 Practical concerns based
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on cost-benefit calculations have arisen with some frequency in various judicial opinions. At the
same time, one member of the Law Lords has derided the “traditionalists” for acting “as if to be
seen openly to read Hansard is akin to being caught with pornography,”143 and it is well known
that judges privately acknowledge looking at Hansard considerably more often than they cite to it
in their opinions.144

II. WHY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY USAGE REMAINS GREATER IN THE U.S.
At this point, it is appropriate to ask what, if any, lessons for American statutory
interpretation can be gleaned from the intricate yet somewhat muddled state of affairs in Britain.
Does the Supreme Court rely on legislative history more often or less frequently than its British
counterpart? Do the two legal cultures share certain approaches to the value of legislative
history or the basic justifications for its use? Are there differences in the two law-making
systems that can help explain why judicial reliance is greater in one country than the other? In
an effort to answer these and related questions, I turn to the perspective afforded by comparative
analysis.
A. Empirical Observations
For quantitative purposes, I have chosen to compare the Law Lords’ legislative history
references from 1996 through 2005 with legislative history treatment by the Supreme Court
during the same ten year period. The comparisons are less than perfect because the universes of
cases being reviewed are not identical. On the British side, I have included all decisions with

Pepper v. Hart, A Footnote to Professor Vogenauer’s Reply to Lord Steyn, 26 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 585, 585-86
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Robin Cooke, The Road Ahead for the Common Law, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 273, 282 (2004). Lord Cooke,
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144
See generally note 54, supra and accompanying text.
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opinions by the Law Lords from January 1996 through December 2005—a total of 591 cases.
On the U.S. side, I have focused on two subsets of Supreme Court decisions from 1996 through
2005 on which I had readily obtainable data—cases that directly addressed some aspect of the
employment relationship (labor and employment decisions),145 and cases that involved
interpretation of a federal tax statute (tax decisions).146
These two subsets of the Supreme Court’s overall decision docket comprise 145
decisions or roughly one-fifth of all decisions with published opinions during the ten-year
period.147 The tax decisions consist only of cases that involve the interpretation of a federal tax
statute and thus are more likely to include references to legislative history than datasets that
feature common law and constitutional decisions as well.148 Still, the two subsets of Supreme
Court decisions, relating to separate areas of federal law, offer useful benchmarks for assessing
whether recent British judicial interest in legislative history equals or approaches U.S. judicial
investment in this interpretive resource.
145
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For the two U.S. datasets, I report not only the numbers of cases in which legislative
history is referenced or discussed by one or more of the justices, but also the numbers of cases
where this resource is affirmatively relied on as a probative or determining factor in the
majority’s reasoning process. Use of legislative history as an asset to justify or buttress the
Court’s holding is more powerful—and less frequent—than the total of all legislative history
references. Instances of reliance on legislative history do not include cases in which legislative
history is referenced descriptively in the course of discussion, or is invoked in a “deflecting”
manner to dismiss the value ascribed to it by a litigant, a lower court, or a dissenting justice.149
Both reliance and overall reference are important and worth noting, and reporting them
separately allows for a more nuanced appreciation of legislative history usage by the Supreme
Court.
I did not include a similar distinction for the Law Lords, however, because it was
impracticable to do so. The Law Lords do not issue formally designated majority opinions.150
The leading speech may announce a result that is endorsed in speeches by other panel members,
but in many instances these additional speeches do not include cross-references to the Hansardrelated reasoning of speeches delivered by colleagues, even the leading speech in the case.151
Accordingly, it is simply too precarious to assume on any regular basis that one Lord of Appeal’s
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reliance on, dismissal of, or citation to Hansard materials is endorsed by others who approve the
same outcome.
Finally, in making the comparison between British and U.S. treatment, I have divided the
ten year period into two equal intervals. Legislative history references are identified for each
five year interval as well as for the entire ten years. Table One reports all results for the 19962005 period.
Table One—Legislative History Treatment 1996-2005:
Percentage of Decisions* Invoking Legislative History152

Law Lords Usage
Supreme Court: Lab & Emp Reference
Lab & Emp Reliance
Tax Reference
Tax Reliance

1996-2000
5.6% (15)
37% (25)
25% (17)
64% (7)
55% (6)

2001-2005
13.4% (43)

Total
9.8% (58)

54% (29)
30% (16)
69% (9)
23% (3)

45% (54)
27% (33)
67% (16)
37.5% (9)

*Actual numbers of decisions using (Law Lords) or referring to/relying on (Supreme Court) legislative history for
each time period are in parenthesis.

As Table One indicates, the Law Lords made use of Hansard materials in at least one
judicial opinion in 9.8 percent of the decisions issued between 1996 and 2005—58 of 591 cases.
Usage has been fairly pervasive rather than being confined to a handful of individual judges.
Over the ten year period, the 58 identified cases include 94 judicial opinions expressly invoking
legislative history. Of the 24 Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who served on more than fifteen
panels during this period, 18 Lords referred to Hansard in at least one judicial opinion.153 Some
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members of the court made greater use of parliamentary materials than others—four Lords of
Appeal (Bingham, Hoffmann, Hope, and Steyn) discussed Hansard in at least nine of their
opinions, and another five (Goff, Hobhouse, Hutton, Nicholls, and Slynn) referred to Hansard
materials on either four or five separate occasions. In 2005, the last year covered by Table One,
six of the twelve sitting Lords of Appeal invoked legislative history materials in two or more
opinions.
The figures in Table One also reveal an intriguing tension between, on the one hand, the
tenor of legislative history debates in the U.S. and Britain and, on the other hand, the reality of
legislative history practice in the two countries. In the United States, Justice Scalia has
consistently criticized the use of legislative history as an aid to interpretation,154 and he has been
joined by some other prominent jurists155 and legal academics.156 There is considerable evidence
that the Supreme Court has been influenced by Justice Scalia’s position: the Court’s reliance on
legislative history has noticeably declined in the years since his arrival in 1986.157 In Britain,
Pepper v. Hart opened the door to legislative history usage starting in the early 1990s. Legal
academics and some jurists have bemoaned the new propensity to refer to Hansard,158 but as
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Table One indicates, citations to and discussion of parliamentary materials by the Law Lords
have increased over the past five years.
The bottom line, however, is that legislative history continues to be invoked by the
Supreme Court far more often than by the Law Lords, although the American dialogue has
highlighted diminished usage and the British debate has focused on excessive references. From
1996 to 2005, Hansard materials were considered by at least one panel member in 9.8 percent of
the 591 Law Lords decisions, whereas legislative history materials were discussed by at least one
Supreme Court justice in 48.3 percent of the 145 reviewed cases. Even when comparing the
Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history by majority authors to help justify a result as
against the Law Lords’ references to legislative history as part of an individual judicial speech,
Supreme Court reliance over the past decade—29.0 percent of the 145 reviewed majority
opinions—is roughly three times greater than the Law Lords’ record of references. When the
comparison is closer to apples and apples—between references to legislative history by judges
on the two highest courts—that history is invoked about five times more often by the Supreme
Court.
One must be careful to keep these rather dramatic differences in perspective. The overall
caseload for the Law Lords is not as heavily statutory as the tax law and workplace law decisions
examined for the Supreme Court.159 Accordingly, the Supreme Court cases reviewed here are
somewhat more likely to trigger references to legislative history. At the same time, the 9.8
percent figure includes instances in which Hansard is referenced not for traditional statutory
interpretation reasons but rather because parliamentary statements by ministers help the court to
4 All E.R. 97, 130-31 (Lord Hope); Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, [2002] N. Ir. L. R. 390,
404-05 (Lord Hoffmann).
159
The “non-statutory” component, however, is less substantial in recent times than some might suppose. See supra
at note 148 (reporting that only about 13% of the 591 Law Lords decisions from 1996 through 2005 do not raise
statutory issues).
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understand agency policies that are being challenged as arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.160
When those references are omitted, the remaining uses of Hansard—to assist the court in
construing the particular words or general purpose of the statute itself—arise in only 6.4 percent
of the 591 decisions.161
It is also relevant that the Law Lords continue to cite to pre-legislative historical materials
such as White Papers and commission reports as helpful in identifying the mischief behind a
statute. In the United States, the primary source for such purpose-related background
information is legislative history, especially committee reports.
Because White Papers and commission reports are invoked with some frequency, it
seemed appropriate to calculate the Law Lords references to these pre-legislative materials over
the same ten year period. From 1996 through 2005, 69 additional Law Lords decisions—11.7
percent of the total—include a judicial opinion that refers to White Papers and/or commission
reports.162 My summary review of these references suggests that a fair number involved merely
de minimis mention, something that was rarely true for references to Hansard during the ten year
period.163 But assuming arguendo that all such references are to be treated identically, the
combined number of cases in which either Hansard or pre-legislative historical materials are
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invoked comes to 21.3 percent of the total—still less than one-half the level of Supreme Court
references to legislative history.
One interesting feature of the Law Lords use of White Papers and commission reports is
that these references virtually doubled during the second half of the ten year period—from 7.8
percent in 1996-2000 to 14.9 percent in 2001-2005.164 Given that the proportion of decisions
with Hansard references more than doubled during this same decade—from 5.6 percent in 19962000 to 13.4 percent in 2001-2005—it would appear that the Law Lords are investing more time
and thought generally in the interpretive potential of historical materials related to the legislative
process.
I explore some implications of this apparent trend in Part III. Meanwhile, however, the
gap between current legislative history usage by the Supreme Court and the Law Lords remains
substantial and warrants some attempt at explanation.
B. Similar Rationales for Valuing Legislative History
Before suggesting factors that account for the sharp differences between the Law Lords
and the Supreme Court, it is worth noting that there are important similarities in approach as
well. Legislative history advocates on the two courts have adopted much the same basic
justifications for valuing that history as an interpretive asset. As part of this support, legislative
history proponents have responded in analogous terms to certain practical and conceptual
objections voiced by critics in both countries.
In Pepper v. Hart, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that allowing courts to rely on
parliamentary materials as an aid to construing ambiguous text would help enforce Parliament’s
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true intent and thereby strengthen legislative supremacy.165 Applying the new rule of Pepper to
the facts at hand, he further concluded that the exchanges between minister and members were
sufficiently prominent, clearly articulated, and contextually persuasive to justify attributing to
Parliament as a whole the understanding and intent expressed by the minister.166
The principle of reasonably imputed institutional approval is also central to judicial
rationales for relying on legislative history in the Supreme Court setting. Justice Stevens,
referring to Congress’s committee-based system of drafting and commenting on bills, has
concluded that busy representatives and senators may appropriately be deemed to have relied on
committee reports and the explanations contained therein to help capture the meaning or
implications of the text on which they voted.167 Justice Stevens has further observed that a
failure by the Court to infer congressional approval from suitably prominent and well-reasoned
legislative history ignores persuasive evidence of congressional intent and disrespects the
lawmaking supremacy accorded to the legislative branch.168
Similarly, Justice Breyer and Justice Souter each have maintained that identifying a
statute’s underlying purpose—very often with the help of legislative history—can provide
essential guidance as to the meaning of enacted text.169 That purpose too is imputed on the basis
of what a reasonable member of Congress would have had in mind.170 The purposive approach
to statutory interpretation has long been embraced by British courts as well,171 and the court in
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Pepper relied on Hansard’s role in discerning legislative purpose as part of its justification for
admitting parliamentary materials.172
One additional dimension of each court’s rationale for using legislative history is that this
resource is regarded by its supporters as clarifying or probative rather than conclusive.
Proponents acknowledge there are risks of misuse, and that legislative history is not binding on a
court reviewing the meaning of text. At the same time, incidents of misuse are viewed as
anecdotal rather than systemic; accordingly, reservations about reliance on legislative history are
properly understood as going to the weight ascribed to such history in a given setting, not its
admissibility in some larger sense.173
Apart from sharing basic rationales, legislative history proponents in Britain and the U.S.
have had to respond to similar concerns about the utility and legitimacy of this resource. A
major practical objection voiced on both sides of the Atlantic involves difficulties of access for
practicing attorneys and others seeking to understand and comply with the law. The court in
Pepper acknowledged this concern but concluded it would have minimal impact, asserting that
projected research costs were exaggerated and observing that attorneys and their clients were
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Vaughn, supra note 171, at 40-41 (contending that legislative history reliance to help identify purpose constrains
judicial discretion by inhibiting judges from letting their own preferences masquerade as those of Parliament);
Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranan, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and its Implications for New Textualist
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See, e.g., Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 218 (Lord Nicholls), 223 (Lord Cooke); National Fed’n of Fed.
Employees v. Department of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 96 (1999) (Breyer, J.). See generally Vogenauer, supra note
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Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49-56, 58-59 (1994).
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adequately managing the analogous logistical and financial challenge of gaining access to often
obscure agency regulations.174
In the U.S., concerns about lack of access to legislative history were expressed over half a
century ago by Justice Jackson.175 They appear to have been overstated even then, at least with
regard to congressional committee reports and floor debates,176 and access to legislative history
is less problematic today given online capabilities available through Westlaw and Lexis, and also
non-fee services.177 Cost remains a relevant factor, but as with Hansard the expenses involved in
securing access to legislative history are perceived as not materially different from the costs
associated with reviewing or monitoring agency regulations.178
Admittedly, electronic access may be somewhat more problematic with respect to
Hansard than for core legislative history materials in the United States. Parliamentary debates
and proceedings are not available online as far back, nor can they be searched as efficiently as is
the case for House and Senate committee reports and the Congressional Record.179 On the other
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hand, Britain is roughly one-fortieth the size of the U.S.,180 and attorneys in Britain generally
will not have to travel as far as their American counterparts to locate basic legislative history
materials in hard copy form.
An often-voiced conceptual criticism of reliance on legislative history is that it wrongly
presumes the existence of a coherent legislative intent. The concern is both that collective
entities such as Parliament and Congress are not capable of having a single or uniform intention,
and that even if such an intention could be hypothesized it cannot sensibly be extrapolated from
isolated fragments of the legislative record.181 For present purposes, it is not necessary to
evaluate these criticisms of intentionalism other than to note that they have essentially been
responded to in the same ways by legislative history advocates in both countries.
Proponents on the Supreme Court and the Law Lords have endorsed the view that the
legislative process possesses a baseline measure of coherence. They accept at least implicitly
that legislators who agree a certain text should become law are able to reach a broadly shared
understanding of the purpose(s) leading to a bill’s introduction and enactment, and they are
further willing to infer that these same legislators may at times adopt a common perspective on
the meaning and implications of certain specific provisions.182 As to the challenge of deriving
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persuasive evidence of intent from various pieces of the legislative history record, this is
regarded as a practical problem, not a conceptual one. Whether statements found in Hansard or
congressional materials should sensibly be construed as part of a broader understanding among
legislators depends on the identity of the speaker, the nature and visibility of his presentation, the
reasoned elaboration contained in his remarks, and other factors that will vary from one statutory
setting to the next, and hence go to the weight of this legislative evidence rather than its
admissibility.
Finally, there is a persistent separation of powers objection to legislative history that is
found in both legal cultures: it is illegitimate to allow the unenacted intentions of legislators to
trump the authority of enacted text or to usurp the interpretive role of courts.183 Once again, the
responses given by the court in Pepper parallel those propounded in the United States.
Legislative history, like other contextual resources, plays a supplemental role in that it helps
attribute meaning to the actual statutory language. A court’s reliance on this history to
understand what Congress or Parliament has enacted is no more a usurpation of the judicial role
than is reliance on canons of construction, or the dictionary, or prior agency interpretive
practice.184
C. Key Differences in Legislative Process and Structure
The similarities in certain basic rationales and responses summarized above contribute to
an understanding of why legislative history is valued as an interpretive resource by the highest
court in each country. There are, however, a number of important differences between the
Legislative Intention in Judicial Interpretation? 18 STAT. L. REV. 235, 237-41 (1997); Joseph Raz, Intention in
Interpretation in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 257-68 (Robert P. George ed. 1996).
183
See, e.g., discussion of Pepper in text accompanying note 24, supra; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 45253 (Scalia J., concurring); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. J.
371, 375-76.
184
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Judge Patricia Wald).
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United States and Britain in terms of legislative processes and structures. Notably, in contrast to
Britain’s parliamentary system the congressional lawmaking enterprise confers a central role on
standing committees, it regularly requires negotiation and compromise to achieve success, and it
includes multiple decisional moments captured by distinct forms of internal commentary. These
differences—separately explored below—help account for why Supreme Court reliance on
legislative history is more robust than is the case for the Law Lords.
1. Standing Committees and Committee Reports
Among legislative history proponents in the United States, committee reports are
regarded as especially useful in shedding light on the meaning or implications of inconclusive
text. Most legislation is written in standing committees whose members remain affiliated from
one Congress to the next and develop a level of expertise over subject areas within their ongoing
jurisdictional ambit. Through formal hearings and executive sessions, and informal discussions
and negotiations, committee members and their staffs devote substantial time and energy to
considering the problems the proposed law is supposed to address and how best to address them.
Committee reports tend to reflect this level of consideration, offering both an overview of the
policy need or “general purpose” behind the legislation and also an analysis of how various
sections or provisions would implement the statute’s “specific intent” in different factual and
legal settings.185
In addition to being well-informed, committee reports also are regarded as highly
accessible due to a format that is orderly and understandable to other members, to the courts, and
to the broader legal community. Reports typically set forth a policy or problem that has given
rise to the need for new legislation and then describe the solution proposed by the new law,
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highlighting features that respond to particular issues or concerns. They also frequently include
additional or minority views, enabling committee members who oppose all or part of the
proposed solution to present their competing concerns in some depth.186
Senators and congresspersons have extolled the educative virtues of committee reports
both as members of the majority party and the opposition. These legislators have analogized the
report to the road map or “bone structure” of a statute, praising the report’s “central explanatory
function” and its role in helping to address ambiguities.187 Even members of the minority have
often looked to committee report explanations to understand what they were voting on,188 to help
focus generally worded statutory text, or to prevent slippage from agreements reached among
key legislators.189
Although committee reports as aids to statutory interpretation have certain limits,190 their
status as the best informed and most accessible category of legislative history has meant that
federal courts turn to them first and foremost for guidance. Thus it is not surprising that of the
42 Supreme Court decisions in tax law or labor/employment law that actually relied on
legislative history between 1996 and 2005, the legislative history deemed persuasive included
committee reports some three-fourths of the time.191
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Committee reporting does not play the same role at all in the British legislative process.
Standing committees in the House of Commons examine bills on a clause-by-clause basis, but
this occurs after full House debate on the bill as a whole on Second Reading.192 Importantly,
committee review of bill sections or clauses takes place only once the bill has received approval
in principle from the House, whereas in Congress committee review and approval are
presumptive preconditions to endorsement by the full chamber. In addition, British standing
committees are identified simply by a letter designation (e.g. A to H): they are not assigned
particular subject matter jurisdictions, and members are selected to serve for each new bill.193
Accordingly, British committees lack the collective continuity and substantive competence that
characterize standing committees in Congress.194
Consistent with the differences between committees in terms of their cohesiveness,
subject matter expertise, and basic function, the work products of parliamentary standing
committees bear little resemblance to House and Senate committee reports. British standing
committees do not issue a detailed report that sets forth the bill’s purpose, summarizes the legal
implications of various provisions, or recounts policy disagreements between bill supporters and
opponents. Instead, the committee work product is typically a transcript of the meetings at
which clause-by-clause review occurred, reporting particular amendments that were moved,
accepted, or withdrawn.195 This recounting of bill modifications, along with question-and-
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answer exchanges between individual committee members and the government’s designated
representative, can sometimes shed light on the meaning of a word or phrase in text, in much the
same way as the similar record of amendments and exchanges that occurred in the House as a
whole.196 But the record of committee proceedings does not offer a coherent explanation for the
bill or an analysis of its key provisions and their policy implications. Nor is this committee
document made available to other legislators and their staffs prior to the initial decision to
approve, modify, or reject the bill as written.
As noted earlier, one member of the Law Lords who harbors grave reservations about
judicial use of Hansard has urged that each bill be accompanied by detailed explanatory
memoranda patterned on congressional committee reports, and he intimated that courts could
properly rely on such legislative materials.197 Since 1999, most public bills have been
accompanied upon introduction by brief explanatory notes drafted by the government department
responsible for the legislation.198 Unlike congressional committee reports, explanatory notes are
neither prepared nor promoted from within the legislature. Largely for this reason, the leading
judicial critic of Hansard regards the new explanatory notes in the same way he assesses other
ministerial statements.199 Meanwhile, in light of the considerable differences in standing
committee work products, a primary source of reliable legislative history in the American
context is simply missing from the British setting.
2. Compromise and Change During the Legislative Process
2005-06, National Lottery Bill Report of Proceedings, 8th Sitting, Nov. 3, 2005, afternoon, both available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmstand.htm.
196
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The committee report distinctions just described are part of a larger difference between
Britain and the United States in terms of how statutes are produced. In Britain, the lawmaking
process is basically linear and efficient. The government exercises control throughout, and
participation by legislators on the floor or in standing committee generally has little substantive
impact.200 The government conceives of and introduces virtually all public bills.201 A
considerable amount of government legislation is accepted at Second Reading by the opposition
party.202 There may then be amendments offered seeking to clarify or refine particular bill
clauses or sections, but these are extremely unlikely to be approved by Parliament if offered by
opposition members or even government backbenchers.203
Because the government enjoys majority support in Parliament for its legislative program
and traditionally imposes tight party discipline, there is rarely a need for it to negotiate or modify
its original position. In the House of Commons, the government as bill manager is most
concerned to push through to enactment and is likely to resist merits-based changes due to time
constraints and related concerns about legislative derailment.204 Government-drafted
amendments are accepted, but these usually result from subsequent thinking or planning by civil
servants (perhaps stimulated by interest groups) rather than compromises or changes proposed by
legislators.205
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The controlled and efficient process by which bills are introduced and enacted in
Parliament has repercussions for the utility of legislative history. Bills that become public laws
generally originate from within government departments or derive from recommendations made
by independent commissions or advisory committees.206 The purpose behind these bills—the
mischief at which they are aimed—is typically set forth in some depth through government
consultative documents such as White Papers or through commission reports. The presence of
such abundant pre-legislative materials means that a minister’s statement in committee or on the
floor, explaining the bill’s purpose or the underlying mischief, is less likely to add substantial
information or policy analysis that is new or otherwise unavailable.
Parliamentary debate about proposed or accepted amendments does produce information
that is more apt to illuminate textual meaning in ways not expressed elsewhere. Major
substantive amendments are not, however, a regular part of the parliamentary enterprise. The
government, which is the only legislative player likely to have such major amendments accepted,
has little incentive to offer them. Ministers steering a bill through Parliament seldom view
themselves as having to compromise or make significant textual modifications in order to
prevail, and the record of parliamentary debates and proceedings therefore contains relatively
few instances in which legislative history can illuminate the meaning of substantially revised or
newly forged statutory text.
Parliamentary exchanges can shed light on the understandings or implications
surrounding more minor textual adjustments.207 This indeed was the situation in Pepper, where
the Finance Minister explained a government decision—made under pressure from
206
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backbenchers—to withdraw an amendment that would have taxed in-house benefits at higher
rates.208 Moreover, even in an efficient legislative environment, the ambiguities inevitably
associated with complex statutory language often drafted under time pressures allow for
legislative history to play some clarifying role.209 Still, the dearth of large scale bargaining or
compromise as part of the legislative process diminishes the explanatory value of parliamentary
narrative accompanying that process.
In the United States, by contrast, due to formal divisions in power between the executive
and legislative branches as well as relatively lax party discipline and various procedural
obstacles within Congress, most major bills that become public laws undergo substantial changes
from introduction to final enactment. For a start, bill introduction in Congress is not part of an
organized or systemic government program. The executive branch plays an important role in the
development of many bills, but it is far from the exclusive initiating actor and may not even be
the primary influence during periods when Congress and the presidency are controlled by
different parties.210
Both bill introduction and legislative agenda formulation are highly decentralized, shaped
by committee chairs who function as independent policy entrepreneurs, by private interest
groups that invest heavily in the re-election campaigns of individual members, and by state and
local governments that exert special influence associated with their separate sovereign status.211
Party leadership in both chambers labors with some success to classify and channel the cascade
of bills that are introduced and emerge from committee. Nonetheless, decisionmaking in the

208

See Pepper, [1993] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 70.
See id at 64; Zander supra note 6, at 21-24; Hurd supra note 200, at 1-2.
210
Between 1968 and 2006, Congress (at least one chamber) and the Presidency were controlled by different parties
for more than two-thirds of the time—27 of 38 years.
211
See generally Alan Grant, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 45-52, 65-66, 302 (5th ed. 1994); James
MacGregor Burns et al., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 229, 353-61 (16th ed. 1995).
209

51

American legislative process is best viewed as dynamic and discontinuous rather than static or
linear: a leading observer’s depiction of Congress as “organized anarchy”212 aptly captures this
reality.
The value attached to inefficiency in the congressional lawmaking model is further
attributable to the range of procedural constraints that allow a determined minority to delay or
obstruct legislation. Some of these constraints are constitutionally explicit although many are
not.213 When combined with the tumultuous nature of agenda-setting and the finite amount of
time available, procedural obstacles effectively invite the formation of majority coalitions that
can negotiate compromises in text at various stages of the process. Many bills—especially if
complex or controversial—are substantially modified or recast from their original form to
accommodate the priorities of wavering colleagues or to coopt segments of the opposition.
Alterations often take place in one or both chambers through the committee process or on the
floor during full debate; they also occur in conference when substantive differences must be
reconciled.
The baseline inefficiencies of Congress’s lawmaking process generate an added
dimension to the value of legislative history in the U.S. setting. Because substantial adjustment
and compromise in text following a bill’s introduction is the rule more than the exception,
committee or floor commentaries that accompany the particular stages of language modification
are capable of shedding light on whatever qualitative changes have taken place. Legislative
deals and bargains are a well-recognized feature of American lawmaking, and in the face of text
that is ambiguous or incomplete, legislative history may illuminate the existence of a
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compromise or help to explain certain subtle aspects of the bargain. Several examples from
relatively recent Supreme Court case law indicate the Court’s appreciation for how legislative
history plays these roles.
In a 1985 decision addressing whether the fiduciary to an employee benefit plan could be
held liable for extra-contractual damages under ERISA,214 the Court relied in part on legislative
history to hold that Congress had not intended to authorize any remedies other than through the
plan itself.215 Justice Stevens for the majority emphasized that the broad statutory relief
described in the Senate committee report differed from the bill version passed by the House, and
that the compromise reached in conference followed the House approach.216
A similar instance of invoking legislative history to help establish the existence of a
compromise occurred in a 1985 decision reviewing whether the Environmental Protection
Agency was prohibited from issuing certain pollutant discharge waivers under the Clean Water
Act.217 Justice White for the majority noted that an early version of the bill had proposed
banning the waivers and that the House-Senate negotiated version of text was inconclusive. The
majority then relied on the House manager’s explanation of the negotiated Conference version to
his colleagues on the House floor, in determining that Congress had not meant to include the
waivers as part of the final statutory deal.218
The Court also uses legislative history to help discern subtle dimensions of a legislative
bargain. A 1994 decision construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act relied on legislative
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history to establish that supporters and opponents had in effect agreed to disagree on whether the
highly contentious 1991 amendments to Title VII should be applied retroactively.219 Based on
an elaborate review of earlier bill versions and Senate floor debates—indicating that no deal had
been reached on the controversial retroactivity issue—Justice Stevens for the Court went on to
hold in favor of the traditional presumption against retroactivity, noting the absence of a
congressional intent to overcome that presumption.220
The examples reviewed here are not meant to suggest that legislative history commentary
is essential to identifying the existence or contours of compromises reached during lawmaking.
Negotiated final arrangements are at times discernible from textual analysis,221 and in any event
not all legislative history accurately captures the essence or fine points of these arrangements.
What matters for comparative purposes is that substantial textual change is a regular feature of
the congressional lawmaking process in a way that differs fundamentally from the British
parliamentary experience, and that this difference has consequences for the utility of legislative
history.
To be sure, compromise on basic policy choices and implementation strategies does
occur in Britain, but differences typically are resolved before bill language is made public—
through debate within a law reform commission, the upper levels of a government ministry, or
the Prime Minister’s inner circle. Given the emphasis on pre-legislative negotiation, it is entirely
rational for British courts to refer regularly to commission reports and White Papers, as noted in
Part II.A above. By contrast, our system relies far more heavily on compromise following bill
219
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introduction. Divisions of power between Congress and the President, and between the House
and Senate, encourage negotiations at various stages of a bill’s progression, and legislative
history associated with these different stages may well capture important dimensions of any
deals that are struck. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court recognizes and
relies on such history to help understand post-introduction legislative bargains, something that is
far less likely to occur for the Law Lords.
3. Singular versus Diverse Sources of Legislative History
The dominant role played by the executive branch in the British lawmaking process has
additional implications with respect to judicial use of legislative history. Prior to Pepper, some
opponents of legislative history voiced the concern that if interpretive resources were to include
parliamentary statements by ministers, courts would in effect be redistributing power from the
legislative branch to the executive by allowing ministerial commentary to influence the meaning
of enacted text.222 The court in Pepper did not explicitly address this particular separation of
powers concern.223 The decision to admit ministerial statements, however, effectively implies
that any risks of executive branch interference with parliamentary sovereignty were outweighed
by the benefits of having access to potentially enlightening explanatory materials. Deferring for
the moment whether the executive branch is likely to misuse these new powers,224 it is worth
noting that the test set forth in Pepper restricts judicial access to legislative history by making
ministerial participation virtually an essential component of what is admissible.
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concern in immediate aftermath of Pepper).
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With respect to the different uses of legislative history sanctioned by Pepper and
subsequent decisions, ministerial presentations are necessary when seeking a clearer
understanding of the government’s own policy that is being subjected to judicial review.225
Ministerial statements are obviously important in other judicial review contexts as well, such as
identifying the mischief at which the statute is aimed and shedding light on the meaning of
particular words or phrases in text. It is conceivable, however, that exchanges among
backbenchers or opposition members could offer probative evidence in these latter settings even
without participation by a government representative.
The Law Lords on rare occasions have referred to non-ministerial exchanges during
parliamentary debate as aids to construing the meaning of text.226 Still, the expectation in light
of Pepper is that ministerial statements are centrally important,227 and the Law Lords invoke
such statements in almost all instances, usually with little or no reference to contextual remarks
by ordinary legislators.228 This limitation on the sources of validly admissible legislative history
means that only a subset of parliamentary debates and proceedings is available for judicial
reference.
By contrast, the universe of legislative history sources to which courts have access in the
U.S. setting is considerably broader. The executive branch regularly contributes to the creation
of legislative history as part of its role in the lawmaking process. Contributions occur primarily
through testimony at committee hearings but also through memoranda or statements placed in
the Congressional Record as attachments to floor remarks by a leading bill advocate or
225
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opponent.229 As previously discussed, however, the executive branch often is not the most
influential actor in legislative proceedings; multiple members of Congress typically play
important roles in the various stages of moving a bill to final enactment.
There are innumerable occasions on which legislative history sources unrelated to
executive branch participation are deemed to help clarify the meaning of enacted text. For
instance, when a congressional committee has eliminated bill language that would have
supported one party’s claims, the Supreme Court may well invoke this change based on its
presumption that Congress does not intend to enact language it has earlier deleted.230 Similarly,
when bill sponsors and supporters describe a provision’s principal aim during floor debate, such
evidence of purpose may lead the Court to conclude that a permissible reading of text is also the
correct reading.231
Even if a bill changes very little from introduction to passage, there are distinct decisional
moments when legislative history can help narrate or explain what has occurred. Committee
reports, floor colloquies reflecting shared understandings, floor statements from managers on
both sides of the aisle, and conference reports all can shed light on the meaning of text. Given
this range of sources, the Supreme Court simply has more types of legislative history material to
consider relying on than does its British counterpart.
4. Opportunism in the Creation of Legislative History
A final structural issue is the possibility that legislative history will be generated for
opportunistic reasons, especially by key participants. Courts are prepared to rely on legislative
history as an aid to construing text, and pivotal actors in the legislative process are aware of this
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reliance. The risk therefore arises that legislative history will include explanations or assertions
about the text refashioning or deviating from the presumptively shared understanding of what
that text means.232 To the extent that courts have good reason to worry about such abuses, their
willingness to rely on legislative history may be chilled. Accordingly, it is worth considering the
likelihood that legislative history in the British and American settings will be manipulated by its
creators.
In Britain, the concern is over manipulation by the executive branch. The executive is
ultimately in charge of drafting virtually all statutory text, and it is also the central player in
creating relevant legislative history. The bright line test set forth in Pepper can be viewed as
allowing if not inviting strategic behavior, by conferring probative value on clear ministerial
statements so long as a court decides that text itself is sufficiently ambiguous. Thus, a minister
worried about the politics of a vote on some controversial issue could avoid a tough public
choice by fudging the relevant text and packing the parliamentary record to slant the ambiguous
provision in terms the government would prefer.233 Alternatively, ministers can infuse the record
with statements purporting to spell out the meaning of statutory sections, anticipating that courts
will tend to defer to such statements instead of launching a more rigorous examination of the
underlying text.234
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There is no indication in the Law Lords opinions applying Pepper that the court has
found ministers engaging in such strategic behavior. Although the conduct may be occurring
without judicial awareness, ministers will be constrained to some degree by the civil servants and
parliamentary counsel who prepare advice for them regarding the meaning of statutory
provisions, and also by the interest groups and media representatives that pay attention to
parliamentary proceedings on important or controversial bills. If a minister in her explanation to
Parliament departs from or distorts the professional advice she has received, such conduct could
be leaked by presumptively neutral officials or attentive lobbyists to interested legislators as well
as the media.235 It is, however, difficult to gauge at this point whether the prospect of informal
oversight—especially with respect to civil servants in the minister’s own department—is having
a substantial deterrent effect.
In the United States, the main concern about manipulation of legislative history stems
from the plethora of record materials being produced by actors within Congress.236 Executive
branch personnel, interested parties outside of government, and members and their legislative
staffs all may be players on a particular bill, and all have a stake in leaving their mark on the
statutory product. Lengthy committee reports, as well as floor colloquies or statements by bill
managers that are inserted unspoken into the Congressional Record, provide ample opportunities
for strategic behavior.
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There are constraints on such behavior by legislative actors—notably certain incentives
within the legislative process that operate to encourage accuracy and probity, especially by
committee leaders (who tend to function as bill managers) and their staffs.237 In the short term,
members know they must rely on colleagues’ representations at the committee stage as to what a
bill means, because Congress operates heavily through its committees and members depend upon
the accuracy of committee-based information in moving the agenda. More generally, members
as repeat players typically aspire in the long-term to a positive relationship with their colleagues
and with the institution. The desire to be viewed as honest and fair even during fierce partisan
disputes thus creates an impetus for committee leaders and floor managers not to overstate or
understate a bill’s general or specific objectives.238
The content and format of committee reports also are visible enough to help offset the
risk of manipulation. Minority views in a report can point out a failure to present adequately or
accurately the position of the majority, or highlight areas of disagreement among committee
members. This provides notice to other legislators, their staffs, and the leadership about the need
to consider controversial matters when the bill reaches the floor.239
In the end, it is difficult to compare the frequency with which legislative history is
opportunistically created in British as opposed to American settings. Risks of abuse arise from
different factors, related to distinct aspects of the respective legislative processes. The main
protection against such abuse involves whistleblowing and its related reputational consequences.
237
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Both lawmaking systems include actors with ample reasons to sound an alarm against legislative
commentary that overstates or undermines the agreed-upon meaning of text. These reasons may
more likely stem from political or partisan factors in the U.S., and from professional or civil
service considerations in Britain. Nonetheless, whistleblowing constraints operate in each
lawmaking system that would seem to render the incidence of abuse anecdotal rather than
systemic.
Underlying these constraints is a belief that the primary audience for legislative history is
other members and not judges. Commentary in standing committees or on the floor can be
attributed to Parliament or Congress as a whole because (or insofar as) the prominence,
amplified reasoning, and persuasive context of the commentary suggests what a reasonable
legislator would have had in mind when voting on the text. By relying on the principle of
reasonably imputed institutional approval, both the Supreme Court and Law Lords have
implicitly endorsed that belief.240
Still, even if it is impracticable to determine which legislative history setting is more
susceptible to manipulation, the three prior factors examined in this part help explain why
legislative history usage is higher in the Supreme Court than the Law Lords.241 Standing
committees in the American setting generate more cohesive and substantively competent
indications of statutory meaning than their British counterparts. Further, because legislative
bargaining and compromise are more frequent in the American context, the accompanying
commentary is more likely to include reliable insights as to how the legislative process has
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shaped the intent underlying enacted text. Finally, the breadth of legislative history sources
available in connection with congressional lawmaking offers courts more materials from which
to glean what the legislature meant when enacting certain inconclusive words or phrases.

III. PREDICTIVE AND NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS

Notwithstanding lower levels of legislative history use by the Law Lords than the
Supreme Court, the Lords of Appeal have now had fourteen years of exposure to parliamentary
materials since Pepper. The initial ebb and flow of their participation, described in Part I,
featured expressions of judicial frustration as well as enthusiasm, but certain signals have begun
to emerge. Recapping key recent developments, Part III.A predicts that the Law Lords are likely
to build on the foundation of Pepper and may well expand upon current patterns of use.
Assuming that there will be no British retreat to the pre-1992 position, Part III.B offers
preliminary normative thoughts based on comparisons of how the two high courts currently
debate and apply this interpretive resource. It proposes that the Supreme Court might wish to
move beyond what has become a somewhat stilted debate between legislative history advocates
and opponents by borrowing from the British approach. It also suggests that the Law Lords’
early efforts to categorize different kinds of parliamentary exchanges as either admissible or
disqualified should yield to the more ad hoc flexible approach followed by Supreme Court
justices who make use of legislative history.
A. The Next Stage of Post-Pepper Development
Quantitative data presented earlier suggests that the Law Lords are in the process of
consolidating if not augmenting a permanent role for legislative history as an interpretive asset.
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The proportion of Law Lords decisions in which at least one judge discusses Hansard materials
was more than twice as high in 2001-2005 as in 1996-2000.242 In addition, the proportion of
decisions referencing White Papers or commission reports increased substantially in the 20012005 period.243 Those pre-legislative materials were deemed admissible in court long before
Pepper. Still, it seems plausible to regard the Law Lords’ increased propensity to refer to them
as part of a growing appreciation for how the intentions underlying enacted text can be identified
and applied based on historical evidence as well as linguistic analysis.
Perhaps more revealing than aggregate trends are two recent decisions in which the Law
Lords stretched their initial rule in setting forth grounds for relying on Hansard. Although
Pepper’s three part test credited only explanatory statements by a minister or other prominent
bill supporter,244 Lord Bingham’s leading speech in the 2005 case of Reg. (Jackson) v. Attorney
General relied on the Hansard-recorded history of approved and defeated amendments to
illuminate the meaning of text.245 Lord Bingham and his colleagues understood that he was not
consulting Hansard materials strictly as authorized under Pepper, because in their view the text
was sufficiently clear without such consultation.246 Lord Bingham’s reliance on drafting history
during the legislative process—reviewed and analyzed through reference to Hansard—represents
a notable if unacknowledged extension of the court’s earlier approach.
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Similarly expansive is the court’s self-conscious valuing of Hansard for confirmatory
purposes in the 2006 case of Harding v. Wealand.247 Although Pepper permitted the use of
ministerial statements only if text was ambiguous or obscure, Lord Hoffman and Lord Rodger
each relied on a parliamentary statement by the Lord Chancellor—offered to defuse a possible
amendment—in order to strengthen their reading of language they regarded in any event as
neither ambiguous nor obscure.248 Lord Carswell, implicitly recognizing this enlargement of
Pepper’s conceptual domain, declared that ministerial statements may be most valuable in
practice to confirm that the text means what it seems to say.249
The conclusion that Hansard may be invoked for such supportive or reinforcing purposes
is noteworthy because it brings the legitimization of legislative history use more in line with
decades of somewhat covert judicial practice—from Lord Denning’s 1979 confession that he
often peeked at Hansard (presumably to see if he had missed anything)250 to recent extrajudicial
statements that the Law Lords look to Hansard (presumably for reassurance) far more often than
they actually cite to the parliamentary record.251 This use of legislative history to confirm plain
meaning also brings British justifications more in line with our own.252 Ironically, legislative
history reliance for confirmatory purposes may be declining in the Supreme Court, as justices
comfortable with such uses decide, even if subconsciously, not to risk losing the allegiance of
247
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Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas by invoking the resource when it performs a supportive rather
than essential function.253
The quantitative and doctrinal evidence highlighted here does not mean that the Law
Lords will now proceed to expand steadily their use of Hansard. The fourteen years since
Pepper was decided contrasts with U.S. experience of 114 years since the Supreme Court
decided Holy Trinity Church,254 the case that in retrospect is viewed as ushering in our modern
legislative history era.255 It was several decades after Holy Trinity Church before judicial
reliance on legislative history became a relatively consistent practice.256 British judges and
academics continue to express some second thoughts about the rule of Pepper and its
consequences, and the Law Lords may well endure a period of uneven development with respect
to Hansard references for the near future.
Nonetheless, the Law Lords since 1992 have come to rely on legislative history for a
range of theoretical reasons that are familiar to American judges and legal academics. As
evidenced in Pepper, parliamentary debates are on occasion important in traditional rule-of-law
terms to help resolve the meaning of ambiguous text. As demonstrated in Jackson and Harding,
both drafting history and ministerial exchanges may be valuable from an intentionalist standpoint
to reinforce or confirm that the apparent meaning of certain statutory words or phases is also the
meaning that members of Parliament most probably had in mind. Finally, as indicated in a series
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of decisions,257 the parliamentary record is relevant in a purposivist context for describing certain
background policy rationales that help inform the interpretive enterprise. In short, the Law Lords
appear to be broadening their insights as to how reference to Hansard sheds light on the existence
of legislative intent and also helps clarify the context in which Parliament chose to enact certain
language as statutory text.258
B. Possible Lessons From Comparative Experience
It seems likely that legislative history references will remain a feature of statutory
interpretation by British courts even as reservations continue to be expressed. With that prospect
in mind, I offer some preliminary thoughts on what the Supreme Court and Law Lords might
learn from one another in terms of how each currently approaches the use of legislative history.
1. Judicial Debate Between Advocates and Skeptics—A Lesson for the Supreme Court?
When the Law Lords in Pepper abandoned prior precedent and authorized consideration
of parliamentary proceedings, they made clear that their new interpretive approach would require
judges to assess just how helpful Hansard might be on a case-by-case basis. Although the
legislative history at issue in Pepper was deemed highly persuasive by the majority,259 Lord
Browne-Wilkinson repeatedly observed that as a general proposition parliamentary materials
contain simply an indication of what mischief was aimed at or what cure intended by the use of
certain words.260 The opinions in Pepper regarded Hansard as one among many aids to the
construction of ambiguous text, one that can assist the court to varying degrees depending on the
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factual circumstances.261 In subsequent decisions, the strongest advocates for invoking
legislative history have reiterated that even when Pepper’s three-part test for admissibility was
satisfied, a court still must assign weight to the ministerial statements in light of all relevant
considerations.262
Legislative history skeptics on the highest court have effectively adopted the same basic
approach in a post-Pepper world. Admissibility of Hansard as a judicial aid is settled, and the
primary issues that trigger debate are whether courts should accord weight to parliamentary
proceedings in varying contexts. Thus for Lord Steyn—the leading judicial critic of Pepper—
Hansard is potentially valuable to courts in order to estop the executive from abandoning its prior
representations in Parliament as to the meaning of particular words or phrases in text.263 Just
how valuable Hansard is for this purpose will vary depending on the circumstances in which an
estoppel argument arises.264
Similarly, Lord Steyn and other legislative history skeptics recognize that Hansard may
be of assistance in identifying the mischief at which a textual provision is aimed, and that such a
role will at times shed light on the meaning of the text under review.265 Judges with reservations
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about some uses of legislative history also are prepared—in suitable circumstances—to rely on
the record of a statute’s drafting history to aid in understanding statutory language.266
The debate within the Law Lords between legislative history advocates and skeptics is
thus about weight more than admissibility. Some judges contend that Hansard should never be
used to help identify parliamentary intent as to the meaning of enacted words or phrases, but
even they agree that Hansard can be valuable in a range of other interpretive settings.
Disagreements on the high court since Pepper suggest the judges are searching for an appropriate
balance in terms of how often to use legislative history, not whether it should be relied on at all.
These disagreements, informed by concern over possible costs imposed on parties and their
counsel who comb through Hansard and on lower court judges who must evaluate the results of
such searches, have produced a lively and at times nuanced set of exchanges.
By contrast, recent debate on the Supreme Court between legislative history advocates
and skeptics has generally been cast in all-or-nothing form. Justice Scalia has shaped the terms
of this debate, insisting that judges ought never to consult, much less rely on, legislative history
when construing statutes.267 In support of his position, Justice Scalia has advanced constitutional
and practical arguments for why courts should eschew all reference to legislative history.268 He
has been joined in this blanket rule approach on some occasions by Justice Thomas, but after

266

See Reg. (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2005] 4 All Eng. Rep. 1253, 1263-64 (Lord
Bingham).
267
See e.g., Scalia, supra note 154, at 31-37; Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-28 (1993) (Scalia J., concurring
in judgment); Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1990-91 (2006) (Scalia J., concurring in judgment).
268
For constitutional arguments, see, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia,
J. concurring in judgment) (invoking separation of powers considerations); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
452-53 (1987) (Scalia J., concurring in judgment) (invoking legislative supremacy considerations). For practical
arguments, see, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, supra note 267, 507 U.S. at 519 (invoking litigation costs to parties);
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia J., concurring in judgment) (invoking likelihood of
opportunistic behavior in creation of legislative history).

68

twenty years by no one else on the Court.269 Several justices have responded to the Scalia
critique, defending or justifying the basic utility of legislative history, albeit with relatively spare
arguments.270 The first term of the Roberts Court suggests there will be no new converts to the
Scalia position—indeed Justice Alito in one of his first majority opinions drew a sharp rebuke
for invoking legislative history to help confirm the Court’s construction of language in a criminal
statute.271
Justice Scalia’s deeply skeptical views were manifested most recently in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.272 An important issue in that case was whether the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA) deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition, pending at the
time of DTA enactment, that was brought by an alien who had been detained by the Department
of Defense at an American prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.273
Justice Stevens for the majority concluded that both the DTA text and its legislative
history reflected Congress’s determination not to remove habeas jurisdiction for cases pending at
the time of enactment.274 In his reliance on the legislative record, Justice Stevens invoked the
DTA’s drafting history, noting that Congress had rejected earlier proposed versions of the statute
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that would have removed the jurisdiction at issue.275 Justice Stevens also pointed to the floor
statement of a leading Senate co-sponsor, delivered during debate preceding the Senate vote,
while discounting contrary statements by two other Senate co-sponsors because they had been
inserted into the Congressional Record after the Senate debate and vote had taken place.276
Justice Scalia in dissent took aim at both prongs of the majority’s legislative history
position. He insisted that the timing of floor statements by Senate sponsors was entirely
irrelevant because such statements by individual members lacked any probative significance.277
Similarly, Justice Scalia reaffirmed his view that there was no reason ever to rely on the drafting
history accompanying a bill’s enactment.278
Supreme Court justices who are prepared to rely on legislative history in at least some
circumstances regularly attach weight to distinctions such as those between pre-enactment and
post-enactment statements, or between live floor debate and inserted remarks; they also regularly
regard drafting history as probative under certain conditions. Even British judges who have
voiced serious reservations about legislative history have accorded weight in some circumstances
both to live parliamentary exchanges and to drafting history.279 They do so because they
subscribe implicitly if not expressly to the principle of reasonably imputed institutional
approval—that the value accorded to legislative history in a given case is linked to whether
congressional or parliamentary materials can persuasively be deemed to have been noticed,
understood, and endorsed by a presumptively reasonable legislator.280 This is not the place to
address the relative merits of conceptual and practical disagreements between Justice Scalia and
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his colleagues regarding the status of legislative history. What matters for present purposes is
that because of Justice Scalia’s committed opposition to any form of legislative history usage,
conceptual disagreements among the justices are almost inevitably cast in terms of admissibility
rather than weight.281
A less noticed side effect of this conceptual debate has been the relatively impoverished
nature of the dialogue on the Court regarding how to approach legislative history as an
interpretive asset. While members of the Law Lords grapple with different ways in which
Hansard might or might not assist in illuminating the meaning of enacted text, members of the
Supreme Court have focused on the threshold issue of admissibility. One could imagine a more
enlightening set of judicial exchanges addressed to the relative utility of legislative history in
diverse settings. There would be ample scope for such exchanges given that sources of
legislative history evidence generated by Congress are at once richer and potentially more
perplexing than what is produced within Parliament.
For instance, should legislative history be regarded as presumptively more valuable to
help resolve textual ambiguities that stem from lack of foresight rather than lack of political
consensus? Is legislative history accompanying omnibus bills generally less suitable for judicial
281
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use because congressional deals on such a grand scale are simply indecipherable? Should
legislative history in certain subject areas be presumed to have less weight where the law is
administered primarily by a federal agency rather than private parties, or where the statutory text
tends to be detailed and technical rather than open-ended and of more general public interest?
There are no ready answers to such questions, and legal scholars are contributing to the
conversation.282 But in light of the current Court’s fault line focused on the threshold
admissibility of legislative history, the justices have played little role in exploring prospects for
how legislative history can or should be valued differently in varying circumstances, an
exploration that is thriving among the Law Lords.
2. Applying Legislative History—A Lesson for the Law Lords?
It is still early in Britain’s post-Pepper period, but the Law Lords have created a series of
putative bright-line classifications to channel how legislative history may be invoked as an
interpretive asset. There is some question as to whether these distinctions among multiple
categories can withstand prolonged scrutiny, but the court’s approach seems in part an effort to
impose order in a new and unfamiliar area of responsibility.
As described more generally in Part I.C above, the Law Lords have recognized two
categories of Hansard usage as unproblematic and as having the potential for general application.
First, Hansard may be consulted by a court to identify the mischief at which a law is aimed, with
the court then applying the mischief-avoidance purpose to assist in construing text. Thus, for
instance, the Law Lords invoked a ministerial discussion of the philosophy behind the 1996
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Arbitration Act when deciding that an arbitrator’s error of law, standing alone, could not be
challenged in Court as “the tribunal exceeding its powers” under the statute.283
The second broadly applicable unproblematic category draws on legislative history
materials to assist in understanding what the government’s policy is when the court reviews
agency decisions for basic fairness or rationality. In this context, the Law Lords have relied on
ministerial explanations in Parliament to help understand government sentencing procedures that
allegedly abridged the right to a fair tribunal284 and government policies for compensating
miscarriages of justice when those policies were alleged to be inadequate.285
Apart from these two categories, described as “innocuous” in a leading 2003 decision,286
some Law Lords have identified a third assertedly noncontroversial use of Hansard, premised on
a rationale of estoppel against the government. This category is meant to prohibit the
government from abandoning in court a clear representation previously made in Parliament with
respect to the meaning of certain statutory words or phrases, or with regard to a government
commitment not to exercise its power in a given situation.287 The estoppel rationale for limiting
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Hansard use has recently been questioned on conceptual grounds,288 but in any event this
category can be expected to have a very narrow application.289
In addition to certain agreed-upon roles for legislative history, the Law Lords have
identified several distinct areas as contentious. A fourth category of Hansard usage that has
become controversial is the one at the core of the Pepper decision. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s
determination—that courts may and at times should rely on statements during parliamentary
debates as an aid to the construction of enacted words or phrases—continues to be endorsed by
many members of the high court but has been renounced by some others.290 The Law Lords also
have declared Hansard references off limits in a fifth and sixth setting regarded as suspect. In
Spath Holme, the court announced that (subject to the improbable government estoppel
exception) ministerial statements addressed to the scope of a government’s statutory powers
were inadmissible in court.291 In Wilson, the Law Lords further concluded that in reviewing
domestic legislation challenged as incompatible with European convention law under the 1998
Human Rights Act, courts could not consult Hansard to aid in resolving issues of
compatibility.292
The distinctions among these various categories may at a minimum require some
adjustment as new controversies arise. For example, the Spath Holme decision involved a
challenge to the government’s exercise of its statutory authority to “provide for…restricting or
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preventing increases of rent.”293 Assuming arguendo that a minister’s parliamentary statement
clearly set forth the justification behind the creation of this power to “restrict[] or prevent[]
increases,” it is not obvious why such legislative history should be excluded as bearing on the
scope of government power rather than taken seriously as relating to the meaning of an enacted
phrase.294 Similarly, when considering the proportionality of a statutory provision under the
Human Rights Act, it is puzzling that the court may find Hansard materials inadmissible to help
determine matters of compatibility, yet useful because related to the background mischief at
which the provision is aimed.295
Whether the particular lines drawn by the Law Lords when applying legislative history
are sustainable in practical and conceptual terms is beyond the scope of this article. For present
comparative law purposes, what stands out is that the judges on the highest court have created as
many as six presumptively strict categories in the course of determining that judicial reliance on
Hansard may in different settings be innocuously helpful, controversial yet beneficial, or
troubling and unwelcome. As for why the court has adopted this somewhat rigid approach, it
may be that such linedrawing is regarded by the judges, even if subconsciously, as the best way
of giving shape to a dramatic new set of responsibilities.
Rules are often favored as legal directives because they are perceived as providing a level
of certainty or predictability.296 The Law Lords may well regard their efforts at classification as
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furnishing important guidance to lower courts that have entered an interpretive domain deemed
off limits for centuries. Such guidance may be especially apt because early evidence indicates
fairly substantial Hansard usage by lower courts.297 Further, such a rule-based approach may be
part of a judicial effort to channel if not confine attorney appetites for this new asset.298
Attorneys’ interest in parliamentary materials creates additional burdens for judges, because the
required submission of Hansard extracts accompanied by a written summary of argument
imposes an extra obligation on courts that rely heavily on oral presentations and that lack law
clerks to aid in the review and analysis of such pre-hearing submissions.299 Finally, the Law
Lords themselves seem somewhat wary of what they have wrought,300 and a series of ostensibly
sharp lines may lend structure to what is for them a rather open-ended enterprise.
In contrast to the Law Lords’ sudden exposure to Hansard, the Supreme Court has been
invoking committee reports, floor statements, and drafting history to assist in construing statutes
on a fairly regular basis for more than half a century.301 Over this period, the Court has not
articulated bright line rules or even a terribly structured approach for legislative history usage.
Instead, the Justices have applied a rather amorphous standard based on reliability, an approach
that tends to take account of the totality of circumstances in a given case.
To be sure, there is a broadly recognized hierarchy of reliable legislative history sources.
Conference reports, standing committee reports, and explanatory floor statements by bill
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sponsors or managers are clustered near the top,302 while legislative inaction, statements by
nonlegislative drafters, and post-enactment history are arrayed close to the bottom.303
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court often finds committee report evidence to be unhelpful or
legislative inaction to be highly probative based on the factors at hand, and the justices do not
appear especially dedicated to assigning any given source a predictable place within the
hierarchy.304 In addition, legislative history sources of all kinds are often regarded as more
valuable or useful to help address the meaning of inconclusive text than to confirm, question, or
supplant the meaning of text that is clear.305 Yet the Court continues to consult legislative
history even when the text itself is unambiguous,306 and it justifies this practice in the face of
other decisions that seem bent on prohibiting it.307
The Supreme Court’s approach when applying legislative history is open to criticism for
being overly vague, and the concept of reliability is not easy to pin down. Professors Eskridge,
Frickey, and Garrett have referred generally to whether a given committee report or floor
manager’s statement constitutes “reliable evidence of consensus within the legislature that can be
routinely discerned by interpreters,”308 and I discussed earlier whether legislative record
evidence “can persuasively be deemed to have been noticed, understood, and endorsed by a
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presumptively reasonable legislator.”309 Although each of these formulations leaves ample—
some would say excessive—room for the exercise of judicial discretion, there are certain
advantages to the use of such an interpretive approach.
One benefit is that the reliability standard is flexible enough for judges to adapt its
application as relevant factors change over time.310 For example, because of advances in
technology such as electronic voting and live telecasts of floor proceedings, members spend
considerably less time than they used to on the floor of the House or Senate, either debating and
listening to one another or discussing privately how they expect to vote.311 It seems reasonable
to infer from this change that floor statements, even those delivered by bill managers, should less
readily be deemed to have been noticed and endorsed by presumptively reasonable legislators
when those legislators’ presence on the floor has become principally associated with the ringing
of a bell to announce a timed vote.312 There is some evidence that in the aggregate the Court’s
reliance on floor statements as a proportion of its overall legislative history reliance has declined
substantially since the late 1980s.313 This decline warrants further investigation, but it seems
plausible that the justices, and litigants who appear before them, may be adjusting their sense of
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what constitutes reliable legislative history in response to changing realities of the lawmaking
process.
Another possible advantage of a less rule-oriented focus is that it forces judges to
acknowledge that they are exercising discretion when invoking some legislative history sources
and not others, or relying on that history for some reasons and not others. In this regard, the
Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach to applying legislative history may reflect the increased sense
of assurance that accompanies a more mature or settled stage of jurisprudence on this topic. The
Court has been making use of legislative history for several generations, and the current justices
have been exposed in their education if not their experience to various complexities of the
lawmaking process.314 It is therefore not surprising that those who make regular use of
legislative history seem comfortable separating wheat from chaff on an individual case basis in
much the same way they do when applying other interpretive resources.315
Over time, British judges—educated and experienced in common law traditions and
practice—may come to adapt their initial approach to the dynamic realities of European as well
as domestic events. The recent opinions in Jackson and Harding suggest an evolving awareness
of how Pepper read literally may unduly confine the court’s ability to make constructive use of
Hansard. Given these developments, it seems possible and perhaps desirable that the Law Lords
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consider a more flexible and less rule-bound approach when determining how best to rely on
parliamentary materials.
CONCLUSION
Fourteen years after Pepper v. Hart, the Law Lords remain in the initial stages of a
fruitful debate concerning the appropriate uses of legislative history. This article suggests that
the British court’s applications and refinements of Pepper, when viewed from a comparative
perspective, can contribute to a deeper understanding of certain interpretive challenges facing
our own federal judiciary.
Both the Law Lords and the Supreme Court rely on legislative record evidence to help
clarify the meaning of statutory text. Some of the judicial rhetoric in Britain reflects concern that
Pandora’s Box has been opened, while discussion regarding recent Supreme Court practice has
focused on the trend toward limiting judicial usage. Notwithstanding these perceptions, the
comparative reality is that over the past decade, Supreme Court use of legislative history well
exceeds Law Lords references to Hansard. An analysis of factors related to the legislative
process within each country helps account for why this substantial difference exists and is likely
to remain in place for the foreseeable future.
At the same time, the article’s examination of aggregate data and doctrinal developments
since 1992 suggests that the Law Lords will continue to rely on parliamentary materials and may
well extend the permissible scope of Hansard references. From a comparative standpoint, it is
intriguing that British legal culture, which shares our basic approach to judicial review of
statutory meaning, now finds enhanced interpretive value in the historical materials that help fuel
the legislative process. By endorsing the legitimacy and utility of Hansard, the Law Lords may
in effect be exerting subtle normative pressure on those who would reject legislative history
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altogether in the U.S. setting. In contrast to Britain, our legislative record features an especially
informative resource—committee reports—and explanatory materials that regularly shed light on
the bargains endemic to our lawmaking enterprise. Those distinctive assets would seem to argue
for our becoming more attentive to the nuances of positive reliance on legislative history, rather
than simply continuing to debate the merits of its wholesale exclusion.
Finally, the comparative explanations and analyses presented here should be viewed as a
first step in the development of an ongoing research agenda. It is important to examine, for
instance, how British lower courts have used Hansard under the rule of Pepper, and how they
respond to the Law Lords’ most recent signals in Jackson and Harding. In addition, British
courts have long made use of traditional textualist resources such as dictionaries and language
canons when interpreting statutes.316 It would be worth exploring how the admissibility of
parliamentary materials is affecting previously settled judicial practices in this regard. As
legislative history becomes a more established element in Britain’s approach to statutory
interpretation, there will doubtless be other ways to pursue how courts in that country consider
what is below the surface and yet fairly understood to be part of enacted text.
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